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Introduction1 
The year 2000 began for the Chileans with the second round of the 
presidential election, the third presidential election since the reinstallation of 
democracy in 1989. For the first time since 1970, Chile has elected a 
socialist president. In addition, for the first time since the transition to 
democracy, the coalition of the parties on the right, traditionally identified 
with Pinochet’s legacy, has obtained support similar to the other coalition. 
The narrow victory of the socialist Ricardo Lagos, leader of the center-left 
coalition, is the final piece of evidence that demonstrates that the Chilean 
party system is undergoing a series of changes2. 
This paper addresses the transformation of the post-authoritarian 
Chilean party system in the ten years since the transition to democracy in 
1990. To the debate surrounding the degree of continuity and change in the 
post Pinochet party system, which flourished just after the transition to 
democracy, must be added new evidence. In particular, I will focus on the 
evolution of polarization during the 1990s in Chile, and I will attempt to 
determine the main reasons that explain the pattern.  
Until 1973, Chile was one of the most stable and longest-lasting  
democracies in Latin America. "In 143 years, Chile experienced only thirteen 
months of unconstitutional rule under some form of junta" (Valenzuela, 1999, 
p. 192). The Chilean party system, compared to other, more elitist-oriented 
Latin American political regimes, was the most European-like of the region 
(Dix, 1989). Four factors explain this characterization: first, the Chilean party 
system was highly institutionalized; second, a complete ideological spectrum, 
in which the electorate was distributed in three thirds, existed; third, the 
content of the societal cleavages that had been frozen into the party system 
was remarkably similar to European cleavages; fourth, partisan politics was 
highly inclusionary and representative in character (Yocelevky, 1996, p. 132). 
Together with these exceptional qualities, Chile was the only country in Latin 
America in which the left had won a presidential election. In this context, and 
despite the strength of the Chilean right, in 1970 Allende became president of 
the Republic, supported by a minority leftist coalition, Unidad Popular (UP)3. 
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Under this government, Chile underwent a process of increasing polarization 
and centrifugal competition among parties. On September 11, 1973, a coup 
d'état interrupted Chilean democracy4. The coup led to a military government 
that lasted until 1989. During this period, political parties were either banned 
or dismantled5. The interruption of the long tradition of democratic rule and its 
substitution by sixteen years of military rule has had an important impact on 
the democratic regime that has arisen subsequently. 
The democratization process began with the 1988 referendum (followed 
by the 1989 presidential and congressional elections), and allowed the return 
of political parties to the political arenas6. Both the 1988 referendum and the 
1989 elections confirmed the parties’ ability to organize into coalitions as an 
adaptive strategy to the electoral system designed by Pinochet's regime. Both 
processes demonstrated that a majority of Chileans supported the alliance of 
the parties that represented the opposition to the authoritarian regime, the 
Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia (CPPD).  
Ten years later, there are both dramatic continuities from 1990 and 
important changes. One crucial continuity is the continued operation of the 
bicoalitional logic. In addition, the CPPD remains in government: it has won 
the presidential election three consecutive times. Third, the religious cleavage 
and the class cleavage remain strong forces in structuring party 
competition. In addition, the left and right poles have maintained their 
support over the 1990s, both in terms of people who identify with the left 
and the right when asked about their ideology and in terms of the vote.  
In contrast, the center has experienced a progressive decrease in the 
number of people identified with it. The party that has traditionally occupied 
the center, Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), has experienced a 
decrease in its electoral support; subsequently, its relative importance within 
the center-left coalition has been reduced. Other important changes which will 
be discussed and explained below include the expansion of the apolitical 
sector, the widening of the gap in citizens’ perceptions between party and 
societal interests (Munck and Bosworth, 1998; Meseguer, 1999), the 
programmatic redefinition of certain political parties, the creation of new 
political parties, the consensus among parties on certain policy areas, and the 
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first evidence of a decrease in the salience of the authoritarian/democratic 
cleavage that arose in the transition to democracy.  
Due to the interrelated character of changes and continuities, there are 
grey areas when we try to comprehensively understand the evolution of all 
these features of the party system. For example, there are the same number 
of parties now as there were before the coup. This overshadows the 
aforementioned transformations within the parties as well as the bipolar logic 
of the party system. Similarly, the argument regarding the continued 
importance of religion and class as structuring cleavages has to be combined 
with a reflection on the new authoritarian/democratic cleavage, which has 
become crucial when dealing with Chilean politics7. This cleavage is rooted on 
the Pinochet experience. Parties strongly disagree on historical aspects such 
as the interpretation of the authoritarian past, and its echoes in debates on the 
current role of the Armed Forces, solutions to Human Rights violations, as 
well as decisions about judging Pinochet and other military elites, among 
other topics. In addition to these historical aspects, this cleavage also 
encompasses issues related to redesignment of institutional arrangements 
inherited from the military rule. But, if there are grey areas in the description of 
the transformation of the Chilean party system, even less consensus exists in 
the literature that explains the evolution of different dimensions of the party 
system. In the following pages, attention will be focused on the evolution of 
polarization in the 1990s in Chile as well as the reasons that have shaped its 
evolution.  
The Study of Polarization in the Chilean Party System  
One of the most contested arenas of literature on the Chilean party 
system over the last decade surrounds both the extent of polarization and the 
reasons for its changing degree. Authors have agreed that a much lower 
degree of polarization exists in the present party system as compared to the 
1973 party system (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Valenzuela, 1995; Munck 
and Bosworth, 1998). The earlier party system has been characterized as 
“extreme polarized pluralism” (Sartori, 1976). Anti-system parties, bilateral 
oppositions (two mutually exclusive oppositions), the metrical center of the 
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system occupied by a party, a large amount of ideological distance, 
prevalence of centrifugal drives over centripetal ones, congenital 
ideological patterning, and an irresponsible opposition are the main 
features that Sartori highlights in describing the Chilean party system 
before the military coup (Sartori, 1976). However, a systematic 
consideration of the reasons for the high levels of polarization that the 
system reached has not occurred. The literature has attempted to explain 
the high degree of polarization in the pre-authoritarian party system through 
discussion of the electoral system, the type of presidentialism (Shugart and 
Carey, 1992), the maximalist style of the elites’ interaction, the emergence 
of a rigid and ideological center party (Scully, 1992), and socio-economic 
aspects, such as the economic recession and the nationalization of some 
of the industries, which made consensus difficult to reach. 
With regard to the evolution of polarization from 1990 to the present, 
scholarly dispute exists both in terms of the extent and nature of 
polarization and in terms of the explanatory factors that have shaped it. It is 
clear that the post-authoritarian party system overall displays a much lower 
degree of polarization than the 1973 party system; however, a consensus 
has not been reached on its description from 1990 on. 
Authors who identify a trend toward a progressive decrease in 
polarization over this past decade include Barrett, Agüero, and Scully. They 
consider the consensus reached among parties over certain policy areas 
as evidence of a decrease in the polarization of the party system that arose 
in 1990 (Barrett, 1998; Agüero, 1998; Scully, 1995). Similarly, Hinzpeter 
and Lehman’s analysis of the trends of convergence in the public opinion 
surveys lead to a diagnosis of moderated patterns in the Chilean political 
arena (Hinzpeter and Lehman, 1999a). A similar conclusion is reached by 
Rabkin, who argues that the electoral system inherited from Pinochet has 
had stabilizing effects on contemporary Chilean politics and that it has 
contributed to the emergence of centripetal competence (Rabkin, 1996). 
This argument about a decrease in polarization is also defended by Rehren. 
His characterization of the evolution of the party system “from centrifugal 
multipartism to centripetal coalition” suggests that the coalitional dynamic has 
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led to a decrease in polarization (Rehren,1997, p. 3).  
In contrast, other authors point to some evidence that indicates that 
polarization may well have increased over the past decade, arguing that it 
is questionable to conclude that polarization has continued decreasing over 
the nineties. Siavelis’ arguments about the strength of factors like the 
number and cultural importance of political parties8, the nature of electoral 
systems at the local and municipal level, and the continued salience of 
ideological cleavages demonstrate the need for caution when assessing a 
decrease in party fragmentation and a trend toward centripetal competition 
(Siavelis, 1997a). Valenzuela reaches a similar conclusion. He analyzes 
the effects of presidentialism in Chile, asserting that it is likely that this form 
of government will exacerbate conflict, leading one to question the idea of a 
decrease in polarization (Valenzuela, 1994)9. 
It can be argued that part of the disagreement regarding the degree 
and direction of polarization over the 1990s arises from conceptualization 
differences. Sanni and Sartori conceptualize polarization as the distance 
between the poles (Sanni and Sartori, 1983). These poles do not have to 
be necessarily left and right, although they argue that left-right distance is 
the best way to measure polarization. However, what is more useful to take 
from these authors’ approach is their distinction between pragmatic and 
ideological politics (Sanni and Sartori, 1983, p. 309). As Mair asserts, 
“ideological politics” refers to domains of identification. Therefore, it deals 
with core, and to some extent abstract, identities. Alternatively, “pragmatic 
politics” refers to domains of competition, dealing with particular issues, 
programs, or policies (Mair, 1997, p. 23). Polarization can occur in either 
dimension, operating at either the mass or the elite level, or both.  
A complementary conceptualization of polarization defines it as “the 
dispersion of the vote away from the relative center of the party system” 
(Coppedge, 1998a). In other words, “polarized party systems are those 
tending toward a bimodal distribution of the vote on the left-right spectrum” 
(Coppedge, 1998b). This definition raises the idea of the relative center. 
Here, the distance between the poles can be reduced not only by 
movements from both sides to the center, but also by unilateral movements 
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of one of the poles toward the center. As Scully argues, the existence of a 
center has been alternatively interpreted as an evidence of a polarized 
party system (for example in Sartori’s characterization of the 1973 Chilean 
party system), and as a sign of a moderated party system, since 
competition it is not reduced to a bipolar logic (Duverger, 1954). In 
response to these counterarguments, Scully asserts that it is not the 
existence of a center, but rather the nature of the center that matters for 
polarization (Scully, 1992). In fact, according to Scully, the nature of the 
center, whether programmatic or positional, is the key aspect to 
understanding the level of polarization. The more programmatic the center, 
the more likely the party system is polarized; the more positional (that is, 
less ideological and more flexible the center party is) the easier it is to 
reach agreement and to decrease polarization. 
The different levels at which polarization can be studied (the elite level 
and the mass level) is one source of disagreement in the assessment of 
the polarization in the post-authoritarian party system. Hinzpeter and 
Lehman examine the level of the electorate, whereas the other authors are 
looking at the elite level. As will be argued later, the Chilean elite seems to 
be more polarized than Chilean electorate. Among the main reasons for 
less polarization at the electorate level are the general lower ability of the 
electorate to make distinctions between programmatic options (Sanni and 
Sartori, 1983), and the process of depoliticization that has taken place in 
Chile at the mass level.  
The differences in the literature also arise from the dimension of 
politics that was being examined, whether ideological or programmatic. 
Here, as it will also be demonstrated, the programmatic level is more likely 
to experience reformulation than the ideological level. The latter aspects 
related to identity are less likely to change over time. A third source of 
disagreement arises within the programmatic dimension. Conclusions 
about polarization here depend on the issues that are considered. The left-
right continuum has traditionally been dominated by the class cleavage. 
Therefore, it is understandable that the trend toward convergence on socio-
economic aspects has been frequently interpreted as a decrease in 
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polarization. This interpretation, however, ignores that other issues are 
structuring party competition and have to be translated onto the left-right 
continuum, such as religion and the authoritarian/democratic cleavage. 
This applies for Chile after the transition to democracy, when the meaning 
of left and right categories was more dominated by the democratic-
authoritarian legacy than socioeconomic issues. The scenario was one 
where rightist parties had tended to justify Pinochet´s rule by making 
positive balances of that period. In contrast, parties placed near the center 
and left of the ideological continuum had condemned the authoritarian past 
and, in different degrees, remarked its negative outcomes.  
In addition to these conceptualizations of polarization, the term 
polarization has also been used to characterize the type of party 
competition (centrifugal and centripetal) and the ability to reach consensus 
within the political system. The arguments regarding institutional 
exacerbation or amelioration of conflict are closer to this meaning; at the 
same time, this meaning of polarization is more closely related to the 
search for the aspects that lead to a polarized situation, than to the 
description of it. 
The conceptualization of polarization that will be used here is based 
on the idea of polarization as distance between the left and right poles from 
the relative center, but it also benefits from the distinction between 
programmatic and ideological polarization. Based on this, I will examine 
how the Chilean parties that occupy different positions along the left-right 
continuum differ (as they move farther from the relative center) and 
converge (as they get closer to the relative center) on different 
programmatic issues. From this conception, the existence and relative 
importance of a center depends on the amount of distance between the left 
and right poles. The more distance between the poles, the more likely that 
a programmatic center exists, and vice versa. 
Objectives, Approach and Structure of the Paper 
This paper seeks to provide a clearer understanding of the pattern that 
polarization has followed in the nineties in Chile. Although there is 
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consensus about the decrease in the polarization of the party system 
between 1973 and 1990, it is not so clear whether the party system has 
become more or less polarized in the 1990s. Together with this description 
of the evolution in party polarization, I also seek to clarify the main reasons 
for the pattern of polarization I identify. 
In order to answer these two questions, this paper recognizes links 
between the ideological and pragmatic dimensions of politics, but it is more 
focused on the latter dimension. This programmatic-oriented approach 
assumes that party competition is more determined by the distance 
between electoral platforms and stands of the parties than by the core 
identities people hold. Therefore, this paper will examine the programmatic 
dimension of polarization more closely than the ideological one. In addition, 
attention will be mainly focused on the elite level. Despite the often-
highlighted strong links between society and parties in Chile, elites retain a 
stronger and more direct impact on the party system dynamics than the 
masses.  
From this starting point, this paper demonstrates that a movement of 
the left to the center of the political spectrum with regard to socio-economic 
issues has occurred at the elite level. Despite this reduction in polarization 
over socio-economic issues, considerable distance continues with regard to 
religious-value related issues (such as abortion, divorce, and censorship) 
and similar distance exists on issues related to the authoritarian legacy 
(such as role of the Armed Forces and human rights violations). At the 
same time, I argue that instead of the type of center (programmatic or 
positional) affecting polarization (Scully, 1992), the positions of the center 
are a reflection of the changes in the other ideological options (left and 
right). A decrease in the differences between the poles on some 
programmatic issues has narrowed down the political space in Chile, 
causing a loss of political space to the center. This accounts, to an 
important extent, for the decrease in the support to the center.  
Secondly, the paper examines the factors that explain the evolution of 
programmatic polarization over the nineties. The argument that I will defend 
is partially rooted in the explanation for the decrease in polarization 
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between 1973 and 1990. At the same time, it is based on the idea that the 
pattern followed by polarization in the Chilean party system and, at a more 
general level, the transformations in the Chilean party system, cannot be 
explained by a simple factor, such as the electoral system or a learning 
experience. In this sense I argue that the evolution of polarization in the 
1990s has been affected by the continued effects of an earlier learning 
experience (Munck and Bosworth, 1998; Lasagna, 1999) with the 
institutional framework derived from the authoritarian regime (mainly, the 
electoral system) (Rabkin, 1996), and socio-economic dynamics. The 
combination of these three aspects has shaped political elites’ strategies to 
a great extent, their distance on various issues, and ultimately, the 
evolution of polarization over the 1990s.  
A study of polarization in Chilean politics is linked to three important 
topics. First, it will illuminate the discussion of the changes and continuities in 
the post-authoritarian Chilean party system by focusing on a single dimension 
of that system. Second, this discussion is related to democratic consolidation 
in Chile. It is not clear whether there is a general threshold of polarization 
among parties above which democratic governability is problematic, or if 
problems with governability arise only when there is a sudden increase in the 
normal degree of polarization for a particular country (Coppedge, 1998a). 
Despite this, it is reasonable to assert that democracy can exist for decades 
despite ideological polarization, but polarization makes governing more 
difficult (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p. 32). This is especially true for the 
case of Chile, given the crucial role that political parties have played in the 
development, maintenance, and breakdown of democracy, and given the 
recognized importance of party system configuration in the performance of 
democratic institutions (Siavelis, 2000, p. 110-111). Third, the study of 
polarization is connected to the discussion of cleavages and to the summary 
of these cleavages in the left-center-right dimension10. The study of 
polarization allows discussion of the main cleavages in terms of their 
polarizing effects and identification of dominating issues in the definition of the 
meaning of the left and right poles. 
I begin in the next section with an explanation of the central changes and 
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continuities in the Chilean party system over the 1990s, as well as the factors 
that account for those changes. In the third section, I will focus my attention 
on the evolution of polarization in the post-authoritarian party system. I will 
examine the degree of polarization on the issues that have dominated party 
competition in Chile over the nineties: issues related to religion and values, 
socio-economic issues, and issues related to the authoritarian/democracy 
cleavage. In addition, I will consider the interaction between the programmatic 
and the ideological level of polarization, as well as the differences between 
the elite’s and the electorate’s degree of polarization. In the fourth section I will 
explain the way in which the authoritarian experience, institutional factors, and 
socio-economic aspects interrelate with parties’ strategies to determine the 
pattern that polarization has followed in the post-authoritarian Chilean party 
system. 
The data in this paper in part have been obtained from surveys to 
Chilean Congressmen. These surveys were made in 1994 and again in 1998 
to a representative sample of congressmen from the five most important 
parties in the House of Deputies (PDC, RN, UDI, PPD, and PS). In these 
surveys, congressmen were asked their opinions on a variety of issues 
including political-institutional arrangements, socio-economic aspects, and 
value issues11. Additional information is found in the programs of the political 
parties for the 2000 Presidential Election. Some of the arguments in the paper 
will be based on or complemented with electoral results, public opinion 
surveys, and information published in the press.  
The Chilean Party System Landscape (1990-1999) 
In 1988 Pinochet’s regime failed its self-designed exam. The 
referendum organized by the authoritarian regime resulted in a rejection of 
another eight-year presidential term by 55% of voters (against 43% who 
supported Pinochet). In the following year, 1989, the first democratic 
elections in seventeen years brought a coalition of center-left parties to 
government, the Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia. The degree 
of change and continuity in the party system displayed in these processes, 
as well as the evolution of the system in the 1990s, has generated a great 
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deal of discussion. Depending on the dimensions that are being analyzed 
and their attributed impact on the party system, some authors emphasize 
the changes in the post–authoritarian party system (Barrett, 1998), and 
others highlight the continuities (Baño, 1989; Coppedge, 1998b).  
In this section I will try to capture the evolution of these changes and 
continuities on the main dimensions of the party system over the nineties. 
The main dynamics that characterize the evolution of the party system over 
the 1990s have occurred such that changes and continuities are 
interrelated. In addition, this section addresses the factors that account for 
these transformations. The evolution of the Chilean party system sets the 
framework for a discussion of polarization that will follow.  
Transformations in the Post-Authoritarian Party System  
The most important transformation in the post-authoritarian party 
system is that a coalitional logic has dominated the partisan landscape. 
The main parties have joined efforts under two electoral alliances: 
Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia and Democracia y Progreso 
(then changed to Alianza para el Progreso and now known as Alianza por 
Chile). Although historically multiparty coalitions were crucial to governing 
in Chile, they were more transitory and less solid than those that exist at 
present (Siavelis, 2000, p. 134; Carey, 1998). More remarkable than the 
existence of coalitions is the success of one of them. The center-left 
coalition Concertación has won all three presidential elections that have 
taken place in the country since the transition to democracy (see table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Results of Presidential Elections 
 1989 Elections 1993 Elections 1999/2000 Elections 
Candidates % votes Candidates % votes Candidates  % votes  
and coalitions  and coalitions  and coalitions 1st round 2nd round 
Concertación Concertación Concertación 
Patricio Aylwin 55.17 Eduardo Frei 57.98 Ricardo Lagos 47.96 51.31 
Alianza Alianza Alianza  
Hernan Buchi 29.40 Arturo Alessandri 24.41 Joaquín Lavín  47.52 48.69 
Independents  Independents  Independents 
Fco Javier Errazuriz 15.43 Jose Piñera 6.18 Arturo Frei Bollar 0.38  
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  Cristian Reitze 1.17 Sara Marín  0.44  
  Eugenio Pizarro 4.70 Gladys Marín 3.19  
  Manfred Max 5.55 Tomás Hirsch 0.51  
Source: TRICEL (Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones) 
 
The confrontation between the coalitions is rooted in the experience of 
repression and persecution of the parties during the dictatorship and in the 
parties’ joint effort on the 1988 referendum. This dynamic has continued in 
subsequent elections, in which parties have been linked (and separated 
from others) by their stances on Pinochet’s legacy and their views on 
democracy. The emergence and stability of the so-called 
authoritarian/democratic cleavage as the central division in terms of party 
competition is the second important transformation in the post-authoritarian 
party system.  
However, the 2000 Presidential Election suggests a decrease in the 
ability of the authoritarian/democratic cleavage to structure partisan 
dynamics. Two facts support this idea. The CPPD won by a more narrow 
margin than before, suggesting a decrease in the power of the elements 
related to Pinochet’s regime as polarizing elements at the mass level. If 
people who used to vote for that coalition are voting now for the opposing 
coalition, this can be explained by the emergence of other issues (such as 
socio-economic ones) as central issues in contemporary party competition. 
At the elite level, the decrease in the importance of Pinochet’s cleavage is 
evidenced by the content of the leaders’ campaigns. Both coalitions have 
focused almost exclusively on issues related to the class cleavage, such as 
the organization of the state, policies to decrease the unemployment rate, 
health, education, and pensions. However, the high level of mobilization 
caused by Pinochet’s return to Chile after sixteen months in London 
suggests an unclear scenario. It demonstrated that electoral marketing, 
more than a decrease in the importance of authoritarian/democratic issues, 
determined the content of the 2000 election campaign.  
Together with the authoritarian/democratic cleavage, the 
aforementioned class cleavage, now converted into a socio-redistributive 
cleavage, and a religious cleavage continue to be important lines of division 
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(Hidalgo, 1991; Scully, 1992). The programmatic differences between 
parties over these issues have also structured part of Chilean party 
competition, although, as Sanni and Sartori argue, the dimensions of 
competition vary over time and from one country to another (Sanni and 
Sartori, 1983). For a few years, the authoritarian/democratic issues have 
had a greater effect in structuring Chilean party competition than have the 
religious-value cleavage and the socio-redistributive cleavage.  
At the mass level, there are some transformations that must be 
examined. The most remarkable one refers to the electorate’s ideological 
distribution. As table 2 shows, from the end of the dictatorship to the 
present, left and right poles have remained relatively stable in terms of their 
importance as ideological options in comparing 1970 to 1999. Between 
1990 and 1999, the right has been able to dramatically increase its support. 
However, compared to the sustained support of the left and right, the 
center has experienced two prominent and interconnected transformations. 
As an ideological option, the center has fallen out of favor with Chileans, 
dropping from 24.2% in 1970 to 10% in 1999. Secondly, this ideological 
alienation has been evidenced by the electoral results: PDC, the party that 
has traditionally been identified by the electorate as the party of the center 
has experienced a progressive drop in electoral support in Congressional 
elections (Table 3). However, when assessing the support obtained by the 
left, center, and right, it must be remembered that these categories have 
relative meanings and that, as will be shown later, there have been 
important redefinitions in the meaning of these poles in the post-
authoritarian party system. Therefore, when noting that left and right have 
maintained their support, it must be noted that it is not the same right, nor, 
more particularly, is it the same left. The same applies for the center.  
 
Table 2 
The Electorate’s Ideological Distribution (1970-1999) % 
Year left/center left center right/center right independent/don’t 
    know/other 
1970 26.0 24.2 26.6 23.2 
1973 42.9 26.8 21.9 8.4 
1986 28.0 41.2 16.6 28.0 
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1990 26.8 28.2 14.3 32.7 
1991 24.2 23.2 13.4 39.1 
1992 30.7 23.2 22.8 23.2 
1993 34.8 20.1 25.6 17.1 
1994 28.0 17.0 28.0 26.0 
1995 25.0 16.0 25.0 34.0 
1996 23.0 23.5 27.0 37.0 
1997 21.0 10.0 22.0 47.0 
1998 26.0 10.0 23.0 43.0 
1999 27.0 10.0 26.0 37.0 
Source: adapted from Siavelis 2000 and some data added from surveys of CEP 
 
Table 3 
Results of Elections to Congress and Senate 
Elections for the House of Deputies by Party and Coalition 
Year 1989 1993 1997 
Pact Party % number % number  % number 
  votes of seats votes  of seats votes of seats 
Concertación  51.5 72 55.4 70 49.9 70 
 PDC 26.0 39 27.1 37 22.3 39 
 PS 0 18 12.0 15 11.1 11 
 PPD 11.5 7 11.8 15 12.6 16 
 Other 14.0 2 4.5 3 3.9 4 
Alianza   34.2 48 36.7 50 36.2 47 
 RN 18.3 32 16.3 29 16.8 23 
 UDI 9.8 14 12.1 15 14.4 17 
 Other 6.1 2 8.3 6 5.0 7 
Independent  14.3 0 7.8 0 13.2 3 
Elections for the Senate by Party and Coalition 
Year 1989 1993 1997 
Pact Party % number % number  % number 
  votes of seats votes  of seats votes of seats 
Concertación  54.4 22 55.5 21 49.9 20 
 PDC 31.9 13 20.3 14 29.4 14 
 PS 0 4 12.7 4 14.6 2 
 PPD 11.5 7 11.8 15 12.6 16 
 Other 10.4 4 7.8 1 1.6 0 
Alianza  34.9 25 39.5 26 36.6 28 
 RN 18.8 13 14.9 11 14.8 7 
 UDI 5.1 2 11.2 3 4.6 6 
 Other 19.0 1 13.4 3 4.6 6 
 Appointed 0 9 0 9 0 10 
Independent  10.7 0 5.8 0 13.5 0 
Source: adapted from Siavelis 2000 
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A trend of depoliticization is another of the important transformations 
that have taken place during the nineties. At least three factors point to the 
depoliticization of the Chilean society. First, as table 4 shows, there has 
been a decline in voter turnout over the nineties12. Second, the percentage 
of people who do not feel identified with any of the positions of the left-right 
continuum has increased, as the column of “independents” and “don’t 
knows” in table 2 shows. Third, even though Chilean parties continue to be 
more representative and rooted in society than in other Latin American 
countries (Munck and Bosworth, 1998), a progressive decline of the 
traditional recognition by the Chilean society of the political parties as the 
main intermediates between the state and the society has occurred 
(Hagopian, 1998)13.  
 
Table 4 
Blank and Null Votes and Abstentions in Chilean Elections (1988-1997) % 
Election Year Null Blank Abstention 
Plebiscite 1988 1.30 0.90 2.69 
Presidential 1989 1.40 1.10 5.28 
Senators 1989 2.90 2.10 5.28 
Deputies 1989 2.68 2.37 5.28 
Municipal 1992 3.06 5.86 10.20 
Senators 1993 3.68 1.85 8.71 
Presidential 1993 4.92 3.45 8.71 
Deputies 1993 5.29 3.35 8.71 
Municipal 1996 7.95 3.02 12.14 
Senators 1997 12.57 4.37 NA 
Deputies 1997 13.54 4.22 NA 
Presidential 2000 NA NA NA 
NA = not available 
Source: Siavelis 2000 
 
In addition to these transformations, the decade after the transition to 
democracy has seen a tendency toward consensus that contrasts with the 
maximalist style of doing politics that dominated part of the sixties and 
especially the early seventies (Valenzuela, 1995, p. 64). This pragmatic 
style has allowed leaders of the right, center and moderate left to negotiate 
agreements for important policy initiatives (Oxhorn, 1994, p. 744). Within 
this trend toward consensus, the center’s disposition to form coalitions, in 
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comparison to its earlier ideological character, is one of the remarkable 
changes (Scully, 1995, p. 136).  
However, the evidence is mixed with regard to this new style of 
interaction. Contemporary events such as the reactions to Pinochet’s 
detention call into question the continuity of such a moderating pattern, now 
that the “transitional spirit” is over. Hand in hand with the importance of the 
contextual features of the transition are the collaborative efforts both within 
parties and among branches of government. Siavelis argues that the 
initially high inter-party and inter-branch collaborative patterns that have 
occurred since the transition to democracy, despite the extreme 
presidentialism, show signs of temporality and likely disappearance 
(Siavelis, 2000).  
Changes and continuities are interrelated, as we have seen in the 
discussion of the patterns of cleavages and in the stability of the support to 
right and left, which goes hand in hand with decreasing support to the 
center. Similarly, continuities are present in the return of political parties to 
the electoral arena, while changes in that arena can be seen in the 
foundation of new ones. The UDI and the RN are new parties, but they 
were formed by politicians who supported the regime. The RN is the new 
label for the former PN14. It is less related than the UDI to Pinochet’s 
regime, in terms of its cadres and in terms of their interpretation of the 
authoritarian regime. The UDI, however, includes a larger number of 
political leaders in its ranks that held prominent positions in the military 
government and it identifies readily with the policies and programs put into 
place by the authoritarian regime (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997, p. 514). 
The UCC is another party that emerged on the right in 1992. In turn, the 
Party for Democracy (PPD), on the left, was conceived as an instrumental 
party of the PS, but it became independent when the PC and the PS were 
able to register legally using their old names15. 
The interrelation between changes and continuities is also apparent in 
the return of parties that existed before the coup, but returned in the post-
authoritarian period with programmatic redefinitions. Especially remarkable 
is the encroachment of the left on more centrist positions. The 
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programmatic reformulation of the Socialist Party (PS) implied the 
acceptance of the role of the market in the economy, the abandonment of 
the Marxist component, and the acceptance of democracy as more than an 
instrumental and transitory stage. As Mainwaring and Scully argue, the 
case of the Chilean Socialist party is the most pronounced in Latin America 
in terms of its redefinition toward the center during the eighties (Mainwaring 
and Scully, 1995, p. 465).  
The transformation of the PS was framed in a context of generalized 
redefinition that is likely to take place in transitional contexts. Yocelevky 
argues a shared vision regarding economic development has emerged 
around the neoliberal model imposed by the dictatorship and continued by 
the democratic government (Yocelevky, 1996, p. 141). The PS is not the 
only party that moved positions: the PDC has moved to the right, though in 
a more gradual and less dramatic manner. Currently, the right wing of the 
PDC seems to have much more weight, leading to disagreements between 
the leftist parties (PS and PPD) and the PDC within the Concertación, and 
to a crisis inside the PDC itself (Hinzpeter and Lehman 1999c). Valenzuela 
asserts that the party is unable to differentiate itself from the Left on 
economic issues and it is divided on key issues such as divorce, driving a 
part of the party toward the right (Valenzuela, 1999, p. 238). 
The right has also undergone some transformation, although this has 
been mostly confined to the RN. Siavelis summarizes the changes in the 
reformulated RN. He asserts that it is a much more politically and 
technically sophisticated cadre of leaders, that it elaborates its own 
strategies, plans, and platforms, rather than simply reacting negatively to its 
opponents’ programs of transformations; and third, that the organization 
and leadership has improved (Siavelis, 2000, p. 117).  
Factors Explaining the Transformations in the Party 
System  
The electoral system, the authoritarian experience, and certain socio-
economic transformations account for the landscape described above of 
interrelated changes and continuities over the 1990s in the Chilean party 
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system.  
Electoral System  
The electoral system designed by the authoritarian regime, and 
inherited by the new democracy, must be considered in order to 
understand the transformation that has taken place in the Chilean party 
system. In designing the electoral system, the authoritarian regime 
considered the high degree of fragmentation, the high degree of 
polarization, and the excessive politicization of the society as responsible 
for the 1973 breakdown of democracy16. The reduction of the multiparty 
system into a two-party system and the overrepresentation of the pro-
government forces of the right were the main goals of Pinochet’s electoral 
reform (Siavelis and Valenzuela, 1996). A majoritarian electoral system 
with two-member congressional districts was adopted and still remains. 
Under this system, parties or coalitions present lists that include a 
candidate for each of the two seats to be filled. The first seat is awarded to 
the candidate with the most votes from the party or coalition list that 
receives the plurality in that district. The second seat is awarded to the 
candidate with the second highest vote total only if his or her total, taken in 
combination with that of his or her list partner, is greater than two thirds of 
the vote, or at least double that of the next closest list. Hence, the system 
tends to favor the second-largest list because, to obtain the two seats, the 
largest party must receive twice the vote of the second largest party, or 
66.7% of the vote of the two largest parties or coalitions17. 
The extent to which Pinochet’s goals have been achieved has been a 
matter of dicussion among authors. The military’s electoral engineering was 
carried out with the expectation that parties could not reach the consensus 
that they, in fact, exhibit now (Scully, 1995). However, parties have taken 
advantage of the legal possibility to form electoral pacts, and the center-left 
coalition has defeated the coalition of the rightist parties three consecutive 
times. In this context, it can be said that the great incentive for pact 
formation has created a bicoalitional logic: two alliances dominate the 
partisan landscape resembling, to an extent, the military’s ideal of a two 
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party system. Of course, as Carey argues, this claim about the effects of 
the reform on the reduction of the fragmentation “depends on whether one 
regards the traditional parties or the broader coalitions as relevant units of 
analysis” (Carey, 1998, p. 4). 
Despite the bicoalitional dynamic of Chilean party system, the 
identities of the parties have been preserved, and the electorate continues 
to be able to identify party labels (Siavelis, 1997a; Valenzuela and Scully, 
1997). Two factors explain the persistence of party labels. First, the deep 
roots that political parties have in the Chilean society have prevented the 
erosion of the party labels, not only during the time when parties were 
banned, but also under the current coalitional logic (Munck and Bosworth, 
1998). Second, in municipal elections, a proportional system exists, in 
which individual parties present candidates in all districts. Although they 
may nominate their candidates as part of pacts or even sub pacts, the 
proportional system contributes to the electorate’s ability to differentiate 
party labels. Therefore, despite the electoral system’s bicoalitional logic, 
there has not been a transformation of the multiparty character of Chilean 
partisan politics (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Siavelis, 1997a).  
In contrast to the partial success in transforming party loyalties, the 
goal of favoring the political parties that supported the military has been 
largely achieved. The second largest majority, which the electoral system 
tends to overepresent, is the right. Apart from the benefits of the 
disproportionality of the electoral system bestowed upon it, the right is 
favored by the existence of nine appointed senators. Established by the 
1980 Constitution,  under this arrangement some of the senators are 
nominated by organisms that are either favorable to or dominated by the 
military and which, therefore, are likely to choose candidates from the 
right18. 
The theoretical justification for this electoral system was to favor the 
stability and governability of the country19. However, it can be argued that 
this electoral system has promoted a pattern of moderation and centripetal 
competence. Proportionality has been undermined under this system and 
exclusion has increased. Siavelis and Valenzuela argue that an 
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exclusionary electoral system can also affect the internal dynamics of 
smaller parties on the right and the left in ways that influence the stability of 
the political system as a whole. “Moderate elements within these parties 
can fall prey to their more extremist colleagues, who have proof that 
participation in electoral politics has nothing to offer in regard to political 
influence and that extra-parliamentary routes to power may be more 
appropriate and effective" (Siavelis and Valenzuela, 1996, p. 92). This 
could be the case, for example, for the Communist Party and its current 
lack of influence on the partisan game in Chile, which contrasts with its 
strong mobilization during the transition to democracy20.  
Authoritarian Experience 
The electoral system is not the only legacy of the authoritarian period 
that has shaped the party system that arose in 1990. The authoritarian 
experience itself was the initial glue for the coalitions. During the 
referendum and in the first democratic elections, the main element 
cementing the coalitions together was the rejection of Pinochet’s regime 
and the struggle for democracy. Once the authoritarian regime was 
overcome, the memories of  the former period (leaders being killed, exiled, 
or persecuted), the interpretations of the past, and differing conceptions of 
democracy have divided coalitions from one another.  
Part of the strength of the opposition between coalitions, which can be 
conceived as the strength of the authoritarian/ democratic cleavage, is 
explained by the electoral system. The incentives for pact formation have 
reinforced the continuity of this cleavage: the issues contained in the 
authoritarian/democratic cleavage have been the link between the 
coalitions. From this point of view, if it had not been for this electoral 
framework, the coalitions would most probably not have lasted, given the 
existence, as will be shown in the following pages, of programmatic 
disagreements within the coalitions. The strength of the Pinochet cleavage 
should decrease as parties cease building their identities on it21. Based on 
these disagreements, some authors have predicted a shift in the 
composition of the alliances, in which the PDC might form a coalition with 
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the RN (Siavelis, 1997a, p. 670). If this took place, it would be a clear 
confirmation of the decrease of Pinochet’s legacy as a cleavage among 
parties: the RN and the PDC have maintained confrontational positions on 
the issues contained in this cleavage and the alliance would be based on 
their agreements in economic, social, and religious/value issues. However, 
it would support the idea that the electoral framework is the basis for the 
coalitional dynamic, as opposed to the authoritarian/democratic cleavage 
and programmatic agreement forming the base of the coalitions. 
In addition to its role in the creation of Pinochet’s cleavage, the 
authoritarian regime has contributed to create the consensus that has 
characterized partisan relations over the 1990s. The learning experience of 
the elite is an explanation for the extensive ability of the parties to reach 
consensus in Chile (Scully, 1995, p. 137). This trend was initiated with the 
agreement that the parties made at the beginning of the transition (Godoy, 
1994). These collaborative patterns have, in the case of the opposition to 
the authoritarian regime, a precedent in informal contacts during the 
authoritarian regime. These contacts were initiated by the militants of the 
parties, more than by the party leaders, and were translated into 
collaborations like the Comando por el No during the 1988 referendum 
(Valenzuela, 1995, p. 69).  
The programmatic redefinitions that have taken place in some of the 
Chilean parties are also partially explained by the authoritarian experience. 
For the left, the experience in exile allowed leaders to view the failures of 
“real” socialism and the merits of social democracy and led to agreement 
around democracy as a form of government (Valenzuela, 1995, p. 69). 
Concurrently, the PDC has evolved into a less ideological and more 
pragmatic center party willing to make pacts. In contrast, the authoritarian 
experience has not had the same learning effect on the parties on the right. 
This is especially remarkable for the case of the UDI. As will be 
demonstrated, the members of this party still display authoritarian 
tendencies, including rationalization of the 1973 military coup and the 
defense of authoritarian regimes in cases of economic or political crisis.  
Finally, the depoliticization trend has its roots in the Pinochet regime, 
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which developed a strategy of radical depoliticization that was only partially 
successful. Although there has been an increase of anti-partisan feelings 
(Meseguer, 1999), one of the goals of the military regime, obviously not 
realized, was to eradicate political parties (Yocelevky, 1996).  
Socio-Economic Transformations 
Part of the transformation of the party system is explained by socio-
economic changes. Pinochet’s regime implemented a package of 
neoliberal policies that led to economic liberalization and social 
transformation22. These were continued after the transition to democracy 
the governments of the Concertación. “The CPPD’s very preferences and 
objectives had undergone a significant change as it began to look 
increasingly favorably on the regime’s economic model and the dynamic 
potential of Chilean business. The importance of the latter to sustain 
economic growth also led the CPPD to moderate its programmatic 
objectives considerably so as to overcome business deep seated distrusts 
of the center-left and thereby avoid a destabilizing fall in investments” 
(Barrett, 1998, p. 30). 
As a result of the policies implemented, there have been important 
interconnected changes in the socio-economic structure. First, Chilean 
macroeconomic statistics, including GPD growth, private consumption, 
unemployment, and inflation, point to a wealthier society (Siavelis, 2000). 
Second, the economic transformation led to a change in the structure of 
employment in both the urban and rural sectors. During the authoritarian 
regime, the relative proportions of employment (and production) in the 
goods-producing sector, in utilities, and in transport declined. Especially 
remarkable is the decrease in public sector employment. In contrast, 
employment grew in commerce, finance and services (Scully, 1992). This 
change in employment evidences a diversification of the economy, 
including for example, an increase in non-copper exports.  
Third, there have been changes in the nature of state-labor and 
employer-worker relations in that much lower levels of labor activism exist 
(Siavelis, 2000, p. 81). The economic transformation extensively weakened 
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the labor movement. For example, transport, which had been a strongly 
unionized sector, experienced a decline in its relative importance in the 
economy. Similarly, the reduction in agricultural labor implies a decline in 
the bargaining power of rural labor. However, this decrease in labor 
activism is also rooted in some changes in labor legislation. During the 
authoritarian period, unions were banned and the rights to strike and 
bargain collectively were eliminated. As a result, and despite the 1990 
reform of the 1979 labor code, union membership in the post-authoritarian 
period is dramatically lower than in the seventies.   
As a consequence of these dynamics, Chilean society appears to be 
less prone to class and ideological conflict, and consensus exists around 
the basic political and economic model that should guide the country’s 
future. This consensus is reflected in the party programs that display 
agreement on important socio-economic aspects. Especially remarkable is 
the programmatic reformulation of the PS as a result of the changes in 
Chilean society. In addition to the socio-economic context, the 
aforementioned learning experience and the need to form coalitions led to 
a moderated pattern in the center, to some extent in the RN, and especially 
in the left, and to programmatic redefinitions. The transformation of the 
Chilean left is also framed in a Latin American and international context of 
redefinition of the left which entailed the almost unanimous acceptance of 
neo liberal policies. This process was accelerated by the experience of 
leftist leaders in exile.  
However, the fact that Chilean society does not express conflict on 
these issues can be a function of despair more than real agreement with 
the current situation. Siavelis argues that despite the overall positive trends 
in macroeconomic statistics, there is evidence of future conflicts regarding 
the economic model. The consensus model has internal contradictions, 
around such critical areas as the distribution of income, poverty, and social 
benefits. The “important political divisions within Chilean society have been 
masked by the process of democratic transition and the forced consensus it 
created. This consensus is perhaps much thinner than analysts of Chilean 
politics have suggested” (Siavelis, 2000, p. 108). 
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Socio-economic transformations play an important role in the 
explanation of the depoliticization trend. Munck and Bosworth argue that 
social and economic changes introduced by Pinochet’s government have 
had a great impact on the strength of social actors. Changes like the 
reduction of the country’s industrial base (which led to the spread of rural-
based production in isolated localities and triggered the growth of the 
informal sector) made it difficult for actors in civil society to become 
organized and strong (Munck and Bosworth, 1998, p. 483).  
In addition, the depoliticization trend could be related to the citizen’s 
perception of a progressive blurring of the differences between ideological 
options. As it has been the case for other countries, some sectors of 
Chilean public opinion appear to believe that left and right programs are 
indistinguishable from one another. This blurring of the differences is 
accentuated by the strategies of politicians in two ways23. First, politicians 
try to capture the median voter by proposing programs and policies that are 
not very radical nor ideologically linked. A clear use of this strategy is found 
in the 2000 Presidential election, during which the two final candidates tried 
to place themselves in the center to capture as many votes as possible. 
Second, according to some authors, “elites have played an active role in 
encouraging the demobilization of society and called for restraint in the 
name of avoiding overloading the state with demands viewed as 
contradictory to the imperatives of the country’s new economic model” 
(Munck and Bosworth, 1998).  
Societal dynamics also help to explain the decrease in the support of 
center. Part of the explanation of the decrease in the support to the PDC is 
found in the eroding effect that results from its position as central party of 
the governing coalition two governments (Valenzuela, 1999, p. 238)24. 
However, the process of secularization that is occurring in Chilean society 
might also contribute to this decrease in center support since the PDC was 
created with, and still maintains, a Social-Christian profile. Over the last few 
years, there has been a decline in the practice of religion. Weekly church 
attendance has fallen from 27% in 1995 to 18% in 1999 (survey from 
Centro de Estudios Públicos, June 1998; Centro de Estudios Públicos, 
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May-June 1995).  
The decrease in support to the center and the depoliticization trend 
are, to some extent, related. Some of the people who do not feel identified 
anymore with the policies and programs of the center have not shifted their 
support to other partisan options. This is suggested by public opinion data. 
The group of people who does not feel identified with any of the options on 
the left-right continuum displays attitudes that are similar to the PDC’s 
positions. For example, they prefer "economic development to equality in 
opportunities and social justice" as well as "public order and security to 
democracy and public and private liberties". Only a small part of people 
who feel alienated from the left-right continuum shows attitudes that would 
indicate that they would vote for leftist parties. Among the people choosing 
"none" there are people who are likely to vote for the right. The electoral left 
(i.e. Socialist Party) gets some votes from the "independents". The 
dominance of rightist attitudes inside the PDC, combined with the “hidden” 
voters of the right in the “non answer” category supports the hypothesis 
that a shift to the right in the Chilean arena has occurred (Hinzpeter and 
Lehmann, 1999b, 1999c). In addition, the depoliticization trend is caused, 
but also evidenced, by anti-partisan feelings, which are very much related 
to the dissatisfaction with the performance of Chilean democracy 
(Meseguer, 1999; Linz and Stepan, 1996). 
The depoliticization trend is caused by the reaction to the authoritarian 
experience, together with disenchantment. Part of the public is alienated 
from the traditional left-right continuum and disappointed with the governing 
coalition. As PDC has been the main party of the coalition and the party of 
the center, people feel less connected with it. 
The evolution of the party system during the 1990s demonstrates that, 
despite certain continuities, there have been changes in the Chilean party 
system. Pinochet’s regime seems to be behind these changes in at least 
three ways: institutional legacy, especially the electoral features; the 
learning experience; and socio-economic engineering. These features, 
together with declining support of the PDC, have also shaped the 
contemporary partisan landscape in Chile. We now turn to the discussion of 
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polarization. 
Evolution of Polarization in the Chilean Party System 
(1990-1999) 
The dynamics of the party system just described suggest neither a 
uniform decrease in polarization nor an increase. The electoral system, for 
example, favors a collaborative pattern among the members of the same 
coalition since they are forced to reach consensus on different 
programmatic aspects, but it also favors a logic of opposition between 
coalitions with the consequent increase in the distance between parties of 
contending coalitions. The example of the progressive substitution of 
authoritarian/democratic issues by socio-economic aspects in party 
competition evidenced by the 1999-2000 campaign suggests a decrease in 
polarization, since the central issues are now those around which more 
consensus exists. However, events like the massive mobilization caused by 
Pinochet’s return to Chile suggest that the authoritarian/democratic 
cleavage still has an important polarizing effect. This section describes the 
pattern of polarization in Chilean partisan politics over the last decade in 
the context of the complex dynamics of the system.  
There are three central sets of issues that structure current party 
competition in Chile and which have alternated as the most salient 
cleavages of party competition25. Religious issues were the main line of 
division in the early days of the independent Republic of Chile. They came 
to be substituted by class conflict as a main dividing issue prior to the 1973 
coup. Since the military regime ended, issues related to authoritarianism 
and democracy as well as Pinochet’s legacy have been the main axes of 
party competition. The distance between parties on these different issues is 
what has been called the polarization in the pragmatic dimension of politics. 
In this section, the paper focuses on differences among the main parties on 
these issues, with the goal of contributing to an understanding of the 
evolution in the degree of polarization in the Chilean party system.  
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Religious-Value Issues 
Religious disputes dominated Chilean politics for several decades of 
the nineteenth century. Class issues came to replace them as a new 
division. However, even after this replacement, religious issues and, more 
broadly, value issues, still played an important role in structuring party 
competition in Chile (Valenzuela, 1995). Perhaps the two most emblematic 
issues of religious-value issues in contemporary politics are abortion and 
divorce. 
With regard to abortion, the elite data in table 5 shows that the PDC is 
closer to the RN and the UDI positions than to the positions of its coalition 
partners. PDC elites and the elites of the parties on the right (UDI, RN) are 
almost unanimously against abortion, whereas some pro-choice deputies 
may be found among the congressmen of the PPD and the PS.  
These positions have evolved over this decade. The number of 
congressmen in the PS and PDC who favor abortion has increased. At the 
same time, although the different response options for 1994 and 1998 
make comparison problematic, it seems clear that PPD congressmen in 
1998 are nearer to PDC, RN and UDI opinions than in 1994. In addition, 
these four parties have seen a radicalization of the opinions against 
abortion. However, there are outliers within these parties who are nearer to 
the opinions of the PS congressmen. The UDI congressmen are the most 
homogeneous both in 1994 and 1998 [against legalization of abortion 
(1994) and totally against liberalization of abortion (1998)]. 
 
Table 5 
Opinions on Abortion among Chilean Congressmen, 1994 and 1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
Opinion Abortion PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
(1994) 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 
In favor 7.1 9.1 0 0 0 
Only in the cases  
established by the law 85.7 72.7 20 22.7 0 
Against 7.1 18.2 80 77.3 100 
Total (N) (12) (12) (29) (22) (12) 
Opinion Abortion PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
(1998) 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 
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Totally in favor 12.5 0 3.4 0 0 
There should be a  
liberalization 50 33.3 6.9 0 5.9 
There should be a  
limitation 12.5 16.7 0 0 0 
Totally against 25 41.7 89.7 88.2 94.1 
No Answer 0 8.3 0 11.8 0 
Total (N) (8) (12) (29) (17) (17) 
Question: what is your opinion about abortion? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
However, party programs do not reflect these divisions within parties 
over abortion. As expected, the RN, the UDI and the PDC express a 
rejection of abortion, but it is striking that the PS and PPD also reject 
abortion. Neither PS nor PPD defend changes in the law regarding this 
issue. Consequently, both the Alianza and the Concertación exclude 
liberalization of abortion from their electoral programs. 
With regard to divorce, less distance between the opinions of the 
parties exists than on abortion: PS and PPD elites are more pro-divorce 
(Table 6). The PDC and RN are somewhat less favorable toward changes 
in divorce law. In sharp contrast, UDI’s opposition to divorce is unanimous. 
In addition, the evolution of opinion on this issue is inverse from that 
followed by abortion opinion. Between 1994 and 1998, a remarkable 
increase of congressmen who are in favor of divorce occurred. In addition 
to the already pro-divorce positions of PS and PPD congressmen, some 
members of RN, and especially of PDC, are now in favor of divorce. Within 
the UDI, despite a decrease in their opposition to divorce, a large number 
of deputies still display attitudes against it. From a coalition perspective, 
PDC is not as far from its coalition partners on divorce as it is on abortion.  
Party programs reflect to some extent the evidence suggested by the 
elite data. PS and PPD programs defend the legalization of divorce. In 
particular, one of the goals of the PS, according to their election program is 
to support the approval of the Ley de Divorcio vincular (PS program for the 
2000 Presidential Election). In contrast, the programs of the PDC, RN and 
UDI were against it. On the issue of divorce, congressmen’s opinions 
correlate with their party programs. However, in the electoral program of 
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the Concertación, due to interparty disagreements, the position of PDC 
(against divorce) is the official one.   
 
Table 6 
Opinions on Divorce among Chilean Congressmen, 1994 and 1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
Opinion Divorce PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
(1994) 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 
In favor 42.9 54.5 13.3 4.5 0 
Only in the cases  
established by the law 50 45.5 60 59.1 0 
Against  7.1 0 23.3 36.4 100 
No Answer 0 0 3.3 0 0 
Total (N) (12) (12) (29) (22) (12) 
Opinion Divorce PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
(1998) 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 
In favor 100 100 58.6 29.4 17.6 
There should be a  
liberalization 0 0 17.2 41.2 11.8 
There should be a  
limitation 0 0 3.4 0 5.9 
Against 0 0 13.8 23.5 64.7 
No Answer 0 0 6.9 5.9 0 
Total (N) (8) (12) (29) (17) (17) 
Question: what is your opinion about divorce? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
The differences within the Concertación and between the coalitions 
are also evident in issues like censorship, values that the educational 
system and mass media should enforce, and the possibility of campaigns 
for sexual education in television and colleges (Programa JOCAS) 
(Fuentes, 1998a). Especially remarkable is the position of the UDI favoring 
censorship (Program of the UDI for the 2000 Presidential Election) and the 
PS opposition to it (Program of the PS for the 2000 Presidential Election)26. 
In addition to these issues, the presence of the Catholic Church in 
politics is a point of disagreement among parties. The elite data suggests 
that the PPD and the PS are the least favorable to the presence of 
Christian values in politics (Table 7). That is consistent with the secular 
tradition of these leftist parties. Secularization of politics has been very 
important to both the UDI and RN since each party was founded. The RN 
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has a secular profile, and the UDI maintains that society should be adjusted 
to the moral order that is the basis of the Christian Western civilization27. 
This support of the Church by the right is reciprocal: the Catholic Church 
aligns with the political right in opposing current government policy in areas 
like sex education. This is interesting given the democratic role that the 
Chilean Church played during the democratization process28.  
 
Table 7 
Degree of Preference on the Presence of Christian Values in Politics among 
Chilean Congressmen, 1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
Preference PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
(1998) 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 
Christian values (1) 0 0 27.6 11.8 56.3 
 (2) 0 8.3 31 23.5 6.3 
 (3) 50 41.7 34.5 41.2 31.3 
 (4) 12.5 16.7 0 11.8 6.3 
Secular principles (5) 37.5 33.3 6.9 11.8 0 
Mean 3.88 3.75 2.28 2.88 1.88 
Total (N) (8) (12) (29) (17) (16) 
Question: are you more in favor of the presence of Christian values in politics or 
secular principles? Use a scale where “1” is high preference of Christian values in 
politics and “5” is high preference of secular values in politics 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
As this discussion shows, there are important differences between 
parties regarding religious-value issues. Polarization in this decade around 
these issues has not decreased as much as some authors suggest. 
Abortion, divorce (to a lesser extent), secularization, and censorship are 
issues around which parties differ. However, it is clear that there are more 
differences within the Concertación on religious-value issues than within 
the Alianza. In addition, the position of the PDC on these issues is 
remarkable, first, because the source of disagreement within the 
Concertación is the PDC positions, which tend to be nearer the rightist 
coalition in aspects related to religion and values than to its coalition 
partners. Second, PDC positions are adopted by the whole coalition when 
presenting a shared electoral program.  
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Socio-Economic Issues 
We turn now to socio-economic issues. Table 8 outlines party 
differences on how much ability congressmen attribute to the state in the 
resolution of conflicts, and table 9 presents the preferred degree of state 
intervention in the market. Parties on the left of the political spectrum have 
given up their hope for a mainly state-regulated economy, but they continue 
to attribute greater ability to the state to affect the economy than parties on 
the right. RN and UDI, on the other hand, favor the market. On these 
issues, PDC opinions are closer to its coalition partners than to RN and 
UDI.   
A similar degree of difference is reflected in the congressmen’s 
perceptions of the necessity of state intervention in the economy (Table 
10), although the existence of only two alternatives responses makes 
answers look more radical than in table 8 and table 9. 
 
Table 8 
Ability of the State to Solve Problems, Opinion of Chilean Congressmen, 1994  
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
State’s ability PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
(1994) 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 
Most of the problems 14.3 0 6.7 0 0 
Quite a few of the  
problems 42.9 63.6 30 13.6 10 
Some of the problems 35.7 36.4 60 59.1 50 
Very few of the  
problems  7.1 0 3.3 27.3 40 
Total (N) (12) (12) (29) (22) (12) 
Question: in your opinion, The State can solve all the problems, most of them, some of 
them or very few of the problems from our society? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
Table 9 
Congressmen’s Preferred Degree of Regulation of the Economy by the State, 
1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
Intervention PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
(1998) 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 
State (1) 0 0 0 0 0 
 (2) 12.5 8.3 13.8 0 0 
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 (3) 75 83.3 55.2 17.6 5.9 
 (4) 12.5 8.3 24.1 58.8 35.3 
Market (5) 0 0 3.4 23.5 58.8 
No Answer 0 0 3.4 0 0 
Mean 3.00 3.00 3.18 4.06 4.53 
Total (N) (8) (12) (29) (17) (17) 
Question: are you more in favor of an economy regulated by the state or by the 
market? Use a 1-5 scale, where "1”means maximum presence of the state in the 
economy and “5” means maximum regulation through the market. 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
Table 10 
Necessity of State Intervention in the Economy, Opinions of Chilean 
Congressmen, 1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
 PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 
The intervention of the State in socio-economic life is the only possible way to 
reduce social inequalities 
Agreement 87.5 100 79.3 29.4 0 
Disagreement 12.5 0 20.7 64.7 100 
No Answer 0 0 0 5.9 0 
The State should intervene little as possible in the society and leave in hands of the 
private sector the attention of the citizens’ needs 
Agreement 12.5 25 31 94.1 94.1 
Disagreement 75.0 75 69 5.9 5.9 
Total (N) (8) (12) (29) (17) (17) 
Question: what is your degree of agreement with the two following assessments? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
There are pragmatic aspects in political economy that need to be 
considered within this cleavage. Table 11 shows congressmen’s answers 
regarding tax policy. The data suggests that RN, UDI and PPD are more 
divided on this question than PDC and PS. At the same time, there are very 
different views on this issue. In contrast, regarding privatization, party 
positions have converged much over the nineties (Table 12 and table 13). 
Table 12 shows that center-left parties (PDC, PPD and PS) are more 
willing in 1998 to privatize those industries with low benefits, than in 1994. 
Table 13 demonstrates that the number of members of UDI and RN willing 
to privatize all public services has decreased between 1994 and 1998.  
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Table 11 
Opinions on Tax Policy among Chilean Congressmen, 1994 and 1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
 PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
Evaluation 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 
Direct Taxes 81.8 100 81.8 66.7 66.7 82.8 27.3 17.6 30 6.3 
Indirect Taxes 18.2 0 18.2 25 26.7 10.3 68.2 47.1 70 18.8 
No answer 0 0 0 8.3 6.7 6.9 4.5 35.3 0 75 
Total (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (16) 
Question: in case it was necessary to raise taxes, do you think that it should be 
done through the increase of direct or indirect taxes? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
Table 12 
Attitudes toward Privatization of State-Owned Industries among Chilean 
Congressmen, 1994 and 1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
 PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
Assessments 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 
Privatize all state-owned  
industry 0 0 0 0 3.3 3.4 50 41.2 70 56.3 
Privatize only industries  
with low benefits 21.4 50 9.1 41.7 36.7 24.1 0 11.8 10 0 
Privatize only industries  
which are not key to the  
country’s development 28.6 25 45.5 58.3 46.7 37.9 36.4 47.1 20 43.8 
I would leave things  
as they are now 28.6 12.5 27.3 0 10 13.8 4.5 0 0 0 
No Answer 21.4 12.5 18.2 0 3.3 20.6 9.1 0 0 0 
Total (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (17) 
Question: which one of the following assessments reflects better your attitude 
toward privatization of state-owned industries? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
Table 13 
Attitudes toward Privatization of Public Services among Chilean Congressmen, 
1994 and 1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
 PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
Assessments 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 
Privatize all public  
services 0 12.5 0 0 0 3.4 50 41.2 70 56.3 
Privatize only services  
with low benefits 14.3 25 9.1 41.7 30 24.1 0 11.8 10 0 
Privatize only services  
with low impact on  
the population  21.4 0 45.5 58.3 36.7 37.9 36.4 47.1 20 43.8 
I would leave things  
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as they are now 42.9 50 27.3 0 16.7 13.8 4.5 0 0 0 
No answer 21.4 12.5 18.2 0 16.7 20.6 9.1 0 0 0 
Total (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (16) 
Question: which one of the following assessments better reflects your attitude 
toward privatization of public services? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
This data demonstrates that some differences across parties remain in 
economic matters. However, these differences are much less than in the 
pre-authoritarian party system. The evolution of the PS, and the position of 
the new created party PPD, demonstrate an important shift to the center 
that the left has made in the last decade. 
Differences among parties are reduced. A review of the party 
programs for the last presidential election shows that there are important 
points of convergence between the two coalitions in the four socio-
economic issues that have dominated the arena of discussion and there 
are some minor differences. Table 11 presents a summary of the policies 
proposed by the two presidential candidates on health, education, labor 
reform, and crime. The differences between the parties are lower than in 
the era before Pinochet’s regime, but there are still “differences of degree”. 
For example, the PS demands a more comprehensive reform of labor 
legislation as well as more state funding for health and for education than 
do the other parties. In contrast, UDI and RN are more cautious and 
reluctant to make comprehensive changes in labor legislation and tend to 
prefer a greater role for the private sector in health care and education.  
 
Table 14 
Suggested Policies of the Two Coalitions on Four Socio-Economic Issues  
Issues Alianza  Concertación 
Health -gradual adoption of a system  -option of choosing private or 
 that allows users to choose the -provide autonomy in generating 
 service they prefer (public or  plans and management of the 
 private) centers to the 26 Health Sevices. 
 -decentralization of the health -elimination of the need for 
 system proving economic solvency before 
 -creation of emergency health any intervention (cheque en  
 insurance (seguro de  garantía) 
 emergencia) so that economic  
 solvency does not have to be  
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 proven before surgery when  
 proving economic solvency  
 before any surgery (cheque en  
 garantía)   
Education -funding for low income families-free education for children under 
 whose children meet six 
 established criteria.  -complete program of grants for  
 -system of loans for those who those who attend University 
 attend University  
Labor legislation -free choice of each worker to -widening of the union rights to all  
 join a union or not. sectors 
 -recognition of collective  -defense of collective bargaining  
 bargaining as a workers’ right -improvement of welfare: raising 
  the minimum wage and  
  unemployment benefits. 
Crime -increase of police surveillance -a faster and more efficient 
 -fulfillment of the sentences judiciary and penitentiary system 
 -drug rehabilitation programs, -improvement of the efficiency of  
 especially among young people the police 
  -active support to initiatives from 
  communities 
  -programs of drug prevention 
Source: Electoral programs for 1999/2000 Presidential Election; La Tercera, 9 
January, 2000 
 
Finally, Carey’s index of party and coalition unity, calculated from the 
voting behavior of parties in Congress, shows that the Concertación and 
the Alianza have high levels of coalitional cohesion on economic issues, 
and a somewhat less cohesion on social issues (though still high) (which 
the index analyzes with military issues)29. At the same time, this index 
shows more cohesion within the center-left coalition than in the coalition of 
the right on socio-economic issues (Carey, 1998). 
Authoritarian/Democratic Issues 
With the return of democracy, a series of issues related to Pinochet’s 
era and to the new democracy emerged and divided political parties. Two 
sets of issues can be distinguished: the first related to interpretations of the 
history and of political culture, and the second, a group of issues related to 
the organization of the Chilean political system. 
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Historical Issues and Political Culture 
The interpretation of the authoritarian past is the first element of 
polarization in the party system within these historical and cultural issues. 
The center and left parties unanimously reject the experience. However, 
there are differences within the parties on the right. According to Barrett, 
the fundamental issue dividing the UDI and the RN are their positions on 
the military regime and its “accomplishments” (Barrett, 1998, p. 51). The 
RN has made an effort to distinguish itself from Pinochet’s regime and to 
present itself as a new democratic party, whereas the UDI defends the 
1973 coup d’état and it asserts that the years of authoritarian rule were 
necessary and positive for the country.  
The congressional evaluation of the military between 1973 and 1990 
gives some clues about the interpretation of the past. As table 15 shows, 
deputies’ positions are divided into two groups. The RN and the UDI 
evaluate the role of the Armed Forces during the authoritarian period as 
positive or very positive. PDC, PPD and PS, however, remember this 
period as negative or very negative. This division between parties is 
consistent within the coalitions (Alianza por Chile and Concertación de 
Partidos Por la Democracia).  
 
Table 15 
Congressional Evaluation of the Role of the Armed Forces during Pinochet’s 
Regime, 1994 and 1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia  Alianza por Chile 
 PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
Evaluation 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 
Very negative (1) 78.6 100 90.9 83.3 73.3 79.3 0 0 0 0 
 (2) 7.1 0 0 8.3 10 10.3 0 0 0 0 
 (3) 7.1 0 9.1 8.3 10 6.9 4.5 17.6 0 0 
 (4) 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 36.4 35.3 30 76.5 
Very positive (5) 7.1 0 0 0 3.3 3.4 59.1 47.1 70 23.5 
Mean  1.50 1.00 1.18 1.25 1.53 1.37 4.55 4.29 4.70 4.23 
TOTAL (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (17) 
Question: given a 1-5 scale, where would you place the role of the Armed Forces in 
Chile during Pinochet’s regime? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
Related to the memory and interpretation of the past, the positions of 
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the parties on human rights violations by the Pinochet regime is evidence 
of existing polarization. Crespo argues that remarkable differences across 
countries in the way they address human rights violations exist. Any 
solution has to combine the demands of the victims with a strategic 
calculus of political stability and the degree of threatening from the armed 
forces (Crespo, 1995, p. 19). In this context, there have been not only 
differences between coalitions but also within each of the coalitions. The 
Concertación represents Pinochet’s victims and it is committed to 
overcome authoritarian enclaves, but at the same time, the Concertación is 
the governing coalition, committed to a program of modernization and 
social democratization that requires stability and governance29. This places 
the Concertación in a difficult conundrum. The PS and PPD have been 
more maximalist in terms of the solutions to the problem, and the PDC less 
willing to address human rights violations. On the other side, the rightist 
coalition has also dealt with some internal dissent. Some members of the 
RN are more sensitive to human rights violations and others adopt the 
UDI’s strategy of ignoring the problem (Garretón, 1996, p. 48).  
The type of political culture within parties polarizes them and shapes 
party labels. Chilean parties differ in their models of democracy. Table 16 
shows congressmen’s attitudes toward political parties. The elites of the 
parties of the Concertación believe that political parties are central to 
political systems, while the RN and the UDI attribute less centrality to 
parties. RN and UDI exhibit the lowest percentages of deputies assigning 
political parties a great centrality, and some of their congressmen strongly 
disagree that political parties are important to democracy.  
 
Table 16 
Necessity of Political Parties to Democracy, 1994 and 1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
 PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
Evaluation 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 
Strong Agreement (1) 85.7 75 72.7 70 96.7 89.7 63.6 41.2 70 41.2 
Agreement (2) 7.1 25 27.3 10 3.3 6.9 22.7 23.5 30 23.5 
Disagreement (3) 7.1 0 0 20 0 0 13.6 17.6 0 5.9 
Strong  
Disagreement (4) 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 0 17.6 0 29.4 
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Total (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (17) 
Question: what is your degree of agreement with the sentence “without political 
parties democracy cannot exist”? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
A second aspect of political culture that demonstrates distance 
between parties is the degree of tolerance towards differing ideologies 
(Table 17). PS and PPD, and to a lesser extent PDC, are highly tolerant to 
the legalization of all political parties, RN and UDI, conversely, could be 
characterized as intermediately tolerant towards the legalization of all 
political parties. 
 
Table 17 
Congressional Attitudes toward the Legalization of Political Parties, 1994 and 
1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
 PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
Assessments 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 
All parties should  
be legalized  78.6 100 81.8 91.7 80 58.6 45.5 47.1 20 35.3 
All parties legalized, 
except those which  
are clearly  
antidemocratic  21.4 0 18.2 8.3 20 41.4 54.5 47.1 80 64.7 
There is a serious 
risk of instability for 
the system if all  
political parties are  
legalized 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.9 0 0 
Total (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (17) 
Question: from the following statements, which one do you agree the most? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
Generally speaking, PDC, PPD, and PS display higher level of trust of 
the democratic model that includes political parties, elections, and citizen 
participation. As table 18 shows, UDI and RN justify the existence of 
authoritarian governments when conditions of political and economic 
instability exist. In Garreton´s words “rightist leaders still do not have a 
value-based commitment to democracy; rather, they have an instrumental 
acceptance of it” (Garretón, 2000, p. 79). A more detailed analysis of the 
profile of those nine congressmen from RN and UDI who display a more 
 41
authoritarian profile shows that, except for one deputy of UDI, the rest are 
highly educated: seven have college degrees and one from UDI has post-
graduate studies. Excepting one congressmen of the RN, they have been 
in politics from at least 1989: one entered politics in 1971 and one in 1969. 
All but one deputy were in politics during the transition to democracy, but 
this experience did not positively affect their views about democracy.  
 
Table 18 
Congressional Assessment of Democracy, 1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos  
 Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
Assessments PPD PS PDC RN UDI 
(1998) (1998) (1998) (1998) (1998) (1998) 
Democracy is always the best form of  
government 100 100 100 64.7 64.7 
Sometimes an authoritarian government  
is better than a democratic one 0 0 0 29.4 23.5 
Don’t know 0 0 0 0 0 
No answer 0 0 0 5.9 11.8 
Total (N) (12) (8) (29) (17) (17) 
Question: from the following statements, which one do you agree the most? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
Political-Institutional Issues 
With regard to the political dimension of the authoritarian/democratic 
issue, several aspects are important in explaining party competition. 
Around these issues, there are different degrees of polarization. The first 
issue over which polarization arises is the role of the Armed Forces in 
contemporary Chile. The parties on the right evaluate this role much more 
positively than do the PS and the PPD (Table 19).  
 
Table 19 
Congressional Evaluation of the Present Role of the Armed Forces, 1994 and 
1998 % 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
 PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
Evaluation 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 
Very negative (1) 0 0 0 0 0 3.6 0 0 0 0 
 (2) 35.7 75 18.2 66.6 13.3 53.6 0 0 0 0 
 (3) 35.7 25 54.5 33.4 43.3 14.3 4.5 17.6 0 5.9 
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 (4) 14.3 0 27.3 0 36.7 28.6 13.6 11.8 30 23.5 
Very positive (5) 14.3 0 0 0 6.7 0 81.8 70.6 70 70.6 
Mean  3.07 2.25 3.09 2.33 3.37 2.67 4.77 4.52 4.7 4.64 
No answer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total (N) (12) (8) (12) (12) (29) (29) (22) (17) (12) (17) 
Question: given a 1-5 scale, where would you place the role of the Armed Forces in 
contemporary Chile? 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
In addition to differing evaluations of the Armed Forces and the 
authoritarian past, each party has a different view of the proper role of the 
military, and the degree of constitutional autonomy it should have. Fuentes 
asserts that this ongoing discussion causes disagreements within different 
coalitions, and within the parties of each coalition (Fuentes, 1999a, 1999b). 
Broadly speaking, the parties in the Concertación defend subordination of 
the Armed Forces and control by civilian rule, whereas the Alianza defends 
the autonomy of the military. However, there are disagreements over the 
military within the RN. The RN appears to favor political neutrality over the 
autonomy of the institution (Program of the RN). The argument surrounding 
the role of the military creates disagreements within coalitions. While PDC 
and PPD favor the participation of the military in the development of the 
country, the PS rejects it. Within the Alianza, the UDI and some sectors of 
the RN favor a developmental role for the Armed Forces, whereas the rest 
of the RN rejects such a role (Fuentes, 1999b).  
Agreement exists in the Concertación on the elimination of part of 
Article 90 of the Constitution, which assigns the Armed Forces the role of 
guarantors of the institutional order of the Republic. The Concertación 
argues that such a role should be performed by all the organs of the state, 
as well as the citizenry (Program of the Concertación for 2000 Presidential 
Election). In contrast, the UDI defends this role (Program of UDI). 
In general terms, the issue of the military creates conflict within both 
coalitions. According to the voting behavior of the parties in Congress, 
however, the Alianza seems to be more divided than the Concertación over 
this issue. The RN is the party that is clearly the most divided (Carey, 
1998). 
Other institutional arrangements cause polarization between parties. 
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The most salient institutional issue is the reform of the electoral system, 
advocated by the center-left coalition. The 2000 Electoral Program of the 
Concertación suggests that the existing electoral system should be 
replaced by a proportional system (proporcional corregido). A second 
institutional issue that polarizes parties is the suggested elimination of the 
designated and lifetime senators, established by the 1980 Constitution. 
Third, the Concertación claims that legislative power should be increased; 
therefore, it proposes a modification of certain attributes of that executive 
power. This is consistent with Carey’s argument. His unity index shows that 
the parties from the Concertación display higher levels of agreement when 
voting on issues related to government reforms, than do the parties from 
the Alianza. The latter coalition is much more divided on politico-
institutional arrangements (Carey, 1998).  
There is an agreement among parties from both coalitions on the 
necessity of decentralization. However, the meaning of decentralization 
varies between coalitions. The Concertación proposes deep 
decentralization of the organization of the state (Program of Concertación 
for the 2000 Election). In contrast, the RN and UDI talk of decentralization 
through transferring power to the individual in order to avoid concentration 
of power by the state (Program of the UDI), so that neither the state nor 
any other social organization invade personal liberty (Program of RN).  
The issues related to the authoritarian past and the democratic 
present divide parties. Parties are divided on these issues in two blocs 
whose composition is coincident with the party composition of the two 
coalitions. The parties on the right display some antidemocratic attitudes 
and conceptions of democracy, especially within the UDI. The RN, 
however, appears to be a more democratic party of the right. The degree of 
dissent within the rightist coalition, Alianza, is higher than in the center-left 
coalition on these issues30. 
Polarization in Pragmatic Politics and Ideological Politics 
It is an assertion of this paper that an analysis of programmatic 
polarization, or “pragmatic politics” polarization, provides a more accurate 
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picture of the degree of polarization of a party system than an analysis of 
polarization at the level of ideological politics31. However, a complete 
assessment of polarization in the post-authoritarian party system must 
address the ideological dimension of politics. Despite the trend toward 
convergence over certain issues that Chilean parties have exhibited, party 
labels indicate differences among parties. Parties are differentiated not only 
on the differences in stances on the issues, but also on the representation 
of different political cultures. These cultures appeal to rational aspects, 
such as programs, but also to irrational aspects.  
The identities of the parties after 1990 have been mediated by the 
authoritarian experience. The center, and especially the left, were 
persecuted, and they have built part of their identity in post-authoritarian 
Chile on this experience. Hilte argues that today’s Chilean left continues to 
be plagued by shared memories of the chaos and drama surrounding the 
Allende years and by the repression which followed. “The left also faces the 
challenge of framing positions within a dominant culture which emphasizes 
the will of the individual rather than the collectivity and within a universal 
context in which socialist models have, for the most part, collapsed” (Hilte, 
1996, p. 302). In this context, “the PS struggled to reconcile its commitment 
to a moderately reformist center-left coalition with the need to preserve its 
own political identity and survival. This came to be expressed primarily 
through the presidential candidacy of Ricardo Lagos, the most visible 
renovated figure” (Barrett, 1998, p. 46). On the other hand, the parties on 
the right, especially the UDI, defend the authoritarian past. 
The existence of these core identities affects the programmatic level. It 
has been argued that “political tendencies persist because they are partly 
the product of collective memories of past political divisions that shaped 
and reshaped the party system“ (University of Miami 2000). Hilte asserts 
that “traumatic political experiences posses the ability to challenge the very 
core of individual political identity” (Hilte, 1996, p. 323). For this reason, 
evidence of a decrease in the distance among parties at the ideological 
dimension of politics is not to be found. The elite data show an increase in 
ideological polarization: between 1994 and 1998, the parties on the right 
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have moved farther to the right and the parties on the left have moved 
farther to the left. The Chilean congressmen place their parties on a scale 
ranging between 2.93 and 6.80 in 1994, whereas in 1998, the placement of 
parties varied between 2.50 and 8.18. This would suggest, first, an 
increase in ideological distance between the poles (from 3.87 points to 5.68 
points). Second, the movement of the parties on the right has been greater 
than the small movement of the left. This second trend indicates that the 
mean score of whole party system has shifted to the right.  
The increase in the distance between the poles is not the only 
surprising feature of the elite data on ideological placement, especially 
given the convergence displayed by Chilean parties on some programmatic 
aspects. It is also remarkable that the data in table 20 do not point to a 
convergence to the center. The programmatic reformulation of the PS 
toward the center does not seem to be captured by an ideological 
movement to the center; rather, the party has moved, in ideological terms, 
even farther to the left. 
However these results can only be considered suggestive. A statistical 
test of differences in means shows that the differences between 1994 and 
1998 are not significant32. In other words, there is not enough evidence to 
infer from these differences in our sample of deputies a general increase in 
Chilean congressmen’s ideological polarization over the 1990s. 
 
Table 20 
Ideological Locations of Chilean Legislators, by Party, on 1-10 left-right Scale, 
1994 and 1998 
 Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia Alianza por Chile 
Mean legislator PS PPD PDC RN UDI 
placement of: 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 1994 1998 
Self 3.21 2.50 3.60 4.09 4.50 4.52 6.59 6.71 6.40 7.94 
Own party 2.93 2.50 4.36 4.00 4.40 4.83 6.36 6.76 6.80 8.18 
The party by congressmen  
of other parties 2.53 2.47 4.19 3.71 4.85 4.62 7.83 7.85 9.13 9.58 
Mean of 3 measures 2.89 2.49 4.05 3.6 4.58 4.6 6.92 7.10 7.44 8.56 
Source: Élites parlamentarias en América Latina 
 
In addition, a contextual factor might be biasing elites’ responses for 
1998. The 1998 survey was partially coincident with Pinochet’s detention. 
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This might be influencing, to an important extent, elites’ apparently higher 
polarization between 1994 and 1998. As Valenzuela and Scully argue, 
“political tendencies are recreated over time by the differential impact of 
new political events on them” (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997, p. 524). A third 
note of caution in interpreting the ideological locations is highlighted by 
Carey. He argues that the most sophisticated analysis of Chilean legislative 
voting behavior suggests that relative partisan locations on economic and 
social policies do not map onto a single left-right dimension scale perfectly. 
Given this multi-dimensional character of partisan locations, the 
unidimensional ideological location scale would not be completely reliable 
in summarizing the ideological universe (Carey, 1998, p. 16). 
Nevertheless, despite the possible bias derived from political 
momentum and from the multi-dimensional character of Chilean politics, 
two ideas can be inferred from this data. First, since political events like 
Pinochet’s detention can accentuate differences among parties, a much 
more conflictive arena is suggested here than is suggested by other 
authors (Barrett, 1998; Rabkin, 1996; Rehren, 1997). Second, the data 
suggests that identities are built over different issues through time. In other 
words, parties use different issues through the years in building their self-
images, depending on the current dominant issues. For 1998, it may be the 
case that deputies had in mind the authoritarian/democracy cleavage, 
along which parties differ more markedly. This would also explain the slight, 
though striking, movement to the left that the interviewed deputies of the 
PS and the PPD exhibit. The memory of the authoritarian period may have 
reemerged due to Pinochet’s detention and may have tended to increase 
the difference on parties’ self images.  
Elites’ polarization and Masses’ polarization 
The assumption that I made at the beginning of this paper that elites 
have a greater impact on the degree of polarization of a party system does 
not imply that masses do not have any effect on party system dynamics. 
The polarization of the masses matters, at least because they apply 
pressure on the political parties. Although data do not exist which could 
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make posible a systematic comparison between the elite and the mass 
polarization on the pragmatic level, the data on public opinion support a 
conclusion that the masses are less polarized than the elites.  
First, opinion surveys show that there are important agreements on 
key issues related to the political and economic momentum of the country 
between those who feel identified with the left and those who feel identified 
with the right. There is agreement, for example, on the main problems to be 
solved, as well as regarding how Frei’s government should be evaluated. 
Second, opinion surveys also suggest a reduction in the importance of 
Pinochet’s cleavage. This is inferred from factors like the decrease in 
importance attributed to solving human rights violations (Hinzpeter and 
Lehman, 1999a). However, events like the large mobilization of people with 
the return of Pinochet to Chile point to the persistence of an important 
degree of polarization.  
Some dynamics explain the higher polarization of elites. First, elites 
tend to make sharper distinctions between left, center, and right. Their 
judgments are likely to be more sophisticated given the greater familiarity 
with those concepts (Sanni and Sartori, 1983). Second, partisan elites’ 
effort to differentiate their parties from other parties contributes to this 
higher degree of polarization of the elites. This argument based on political 
agency also reveals its usefulness when dealing with other dimensions of 
Chilean party politics, such as cleavage structures. In this sense, Torcal 
and Mainwaring (2003) suggest that elites´ actions are more powerful than 
sociologically based approaches when explaining the main cleavages over 
the nineties in Chile. In addition, the mentioned trend of elites affecting 
polarization should be aggravated if Downs’ argument is true. Downs 
argues that in multiparty systems, the politicians’ effort to differentiate the 
content of their party labels is higher than in two-party systems (Downs, 
1957). Third, part of the lower degree of polarization in the masses is due 
to the depoliticization trend in Chile, from which political elites are obviously 
excluded.  
Over-all Assessment of the Evolution of Polarization Over 
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the Nineties 
In order to complete the assessment of the evolution of polarization in 
the Chilean post-authoritarian party system, general conclusions will be 
drawn: 
- Consensus over certain policy areas has been reached, mostly on 
socio-economic issues. Important distances between parties on moral and 
religious issues remain, as well as on issues related to the 
authoritarian/democratic cleavage. 
- The lowest distance between coalitions is on the socio-economic 
cleavage, and the most polarizing issues are the authoritarian/democratic 
ones.    
- Polarization on issues occurs not only between the coalitions but also 
there is distance within each coalition. The most divisive issues for the 
Alianza are those related to the authoritarian/democratic cleavage. For the 
Concertación, the issues with the greatest polarizing effect are religious 
value-related.  
- The party system has moved to the right. The PS and PPD programs 
have been redefined and have a more centrist profile, and the PDC right 
wing has increased in strength, moving the party to the right.  
- Empirical and theoretical reasons exist to justify the contention that 
polarization at the elite level is higher than at the mass level.  
Towards an Explanation of the Polarization in the Chilean 
Party System (1990-1999) 
The description of the evolution of polarization during the 1990s 
demonstrates a decrease in distance between parties on socio-economic 
issues, but a persistence of differences over religious-value issues and the 
authoritarian/democratic cleavage. Polarization, depending on the issue, is 
higher between coalitions than within coalitions, or vice versa.  
In this section, the paper aims to explain the factors that produce this 
pattern of low polarization in socio-economic issues, in combination with a 
persistence of distance on religious-values issues and on the 
 49
authoritarian/democratic cleavage. I argue that three sets of factors have 
affected elites’ choices: socio-economic changes; institutional framework; 
including the electoral system and form of government; and the 
authoritarian experience. In addition, the cross-cutting nature of cleavages 
and differing degree of “negotiability” of issues intervene in the evolution of 
polarization in the 1990s.  
Authoritarian Experience 
The authoritarian period has affected polarization in two ways. First, 
the memory of the military period has split the party system into two 
coalitions, each joined by a shared experience and view of the past regime. 
This has contributed to a decrease in polarization among the parties of 
each of the coalitions. At the same time, the authoritarian/democratic 
cleavage has contributed to an increase in polarization between the two 
coalitions. 
The second effect of the authoritarian period on polarization is through 
the learning experience of elites during the military period. This has led to a 
general pattern of moderation. Elite experiences, together with the way that 
transition occurred, have contributed to a convergence on certain socio-
economic issues and, in a more unclear way, to consensus on some 
aspects related to democracy. As the elite data shows, parties on the right 
do not display a clear democratic profile. Secondly, the convergence on 
socio-economic issues has been almost exclusively a product of a 
movement of the left, as I will argue below. 
Over all, the authoritarian experience has been a moderating force 
during the 1990s, due to its interaction with other factors. The institutional 
framework of Chile retains certain authoritarian enclaves that prevent 
parties on the center-left from taking maximalist strategies that they may 
prefer, like the reform of the 1980 Constitution. In addition, Chile’s 
economic success, due in part to the neoliberal model implemented under 
Pinochet, made impossible a frontal attack on all the elements of the 
authoritarian period. Due to this interaction of factors, polarizing effects 
from the authoritarian experience have been attenuated during the 1990s. 
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Institutional Framework: Electoral System and Form of 
Government 
As in the case of historical memory of authoritarianism, the electoral 
system inherited from the authoritarian period has led both to an increase 
and a decrease in polarization. On one side, it promotes a coalitional 
system that has led to a bipolar logic, with the subsequent increase of 
competition between coalitions. The elite data and analyses such as 
Carey’s study of the voting behavior of parties in the Chilean Congress 
confirm the existence of sharp divisions between coalitions that are the 
result of coalition membership rather than the ideological difference 
between coalitions (Carey, 1998).  
However, the electoral system also contributes to the reduction of 
polarization. Parties need to follow a coalitional strategy in order to attain 
power; therefore, they must reach agreement with their coalitional partners. 
In addition, coalitions are important in constraining legislators’ voting 
behavior. These two effects of coalitions explain part of the differences that 
we have observed between deputies’ opinions and their official party and 
coalition programs. Carey argues that negotiations over nominations and 
policy are a constant source of tension within each coalition (Carey, 1998). 
However, these tensions are resolved in compromise and cohesion within 
the coalitions.  
Overall, the electoral system and its incentives for coalition formation 
hide some of the real divisions among parties that are evidenced when 
analyzing party programs individually. For example, divisions within the 
Concertación related to religious-value issues have been ameliorated 
during the 1990s through the adoption of consensus stances which have 
been closer to Alianza’s position than if parties within Concertación had 
competed individually.  
Another institutional aspect that should be considered, due to its 
effects on partisan polarization, is the strong type of presidentialism 
adopted by the 1980 Constitution. Siavelis asserts that it has features 
highly conducive to increases in political conflict. The great power of the 
president and the minimum role of the legislature do not tend to promote 
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interparty and interbranch collaboration and lead to increases in 
polarization. However, due to contextual features, this has not been fully 
appreciated (Siavelis, 2000). Therefore, for the case of polarization in the 
post-authoritarian party system, the electoral system seems to be the 
institutional aspect that has the clearest impact upon the pattern of 
polarization.  
In addition to the electoral system and the existence of appointed 
senators, other authoritarian enclaves remain in the Chilean political 
system. These include the constitutionally established direct and indirect 
presence of the Armed Forces in certain organs of the state apparatus33. 
They have prevented radical transformations. Concurrently, as was noted 
in the third section, these authoritarian enclaves are objects of polarization, 
and are considered here as part of the authoritarian /democratic cleavage.  
Socio-Economic Transformations 
Transformations in Chilean social and economic structure, resulting 
from Pinochet’s neoliberal policies, led to the reformulations of leftist 
parties' socio-economic policies. The Chilean Left experienced a shift to the 
center that, consequently, means a decrease in the distance between leftist 
and rightist parties on socio-economic issues.  
The positive economic results of Pinochet’s regime have placed the 
right in a privileged position because their socio-economic policies for the 
development of the country have been legitimized. “The economic success 
of the later Pinochet years bolstered confidence among neoliberals and the 
subsequent regeneration among political forces of the right” (Mainwaring 
and Scully, 1995, p. 469). As a consequence, the right has not had any 
incentive to reformulate their economic program, because there has been a 
progressive increase in electoral support. 
Socio-economic change and positive economic outcomes demonstrate 
that the convergence on socio-economic issues has been the result of a 
unilateral movement of the left to the center. Almost all of the agreement on 
socio-economic issues is derived from movement of the left and the center 
to the right, and in almost no issue-areas have the right moved to the 
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center. However, there is a danger of overestimating the degree of 
agreement on socio-economic issues between left and right. In analysis of 
party programs, the researcher must remember that these can be largely 
mediated by electoral strategies34. As the elite data demonstrates and as 
the electoral platforms show, differences remain between left and right 
regarding the intervention of the state in economy. These differences are 
confirmed in legislators’ voting behavior. For example, despite the apparent 
consensus in party programs on certain issues related to labor legislation, 
legislators have been unable to agree to a package of reforms regarding 
this issue35.  
Due to the traditional dominance of economic content in the meanings 
of left and right, the movement of the Chilean left toward somewhat more 
rightist positions on socio-economic aspects has tended to be interpreted 
as an overall movement of the entire party system to the right. However, as 
I have argued above, there are other issues that structure party competition 
and which have to be considered when assessing an increase or a 
decrease in the distance between left and right poles. 
Degree of “negotiability” of the Issues 
The differing nature of the issues that dominate party competition also 
helps to explain why convergence exists on some issues, but not on others. 
Lipset and Rokkan argued that the issues related to the religion-values 
cleavage are more difficult to negotiate, since they touch on irrational and 
deeply embedded beliefs, whereas on economic issues, agreement and 
convergence are less difficult to reach (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). This idea 
seems to explain why the reduction of polarization has occurred more often 
on socio-economic aspects and not on the religious-value cleavage in the 
Chilean case. As the authoritarian/democratic cleavage also deals with 
deep-seated beliefs, the nature of this cleavage also precludes consensus. 
However, it is unclear if the Lipset and Rokkan argument travels well for 
any country at any time. For example, part of the conflict in pre-
authoritarian Chile were based on the existence of three very different 
socio-economic projects, defended in turn by the right, the center, and at 
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that time the governing left. Despite its a priori more negotiable character, 
convergence on these issues among the different parties has only been 
reached after seventeen years of authoritarian rule.  
Cross-Cutting Nature of the Cleavages 
The opinions and policies held by the parties are structured in such a 
way that depending on the issue, the party that holds the opposite opinion 
varies. In other words, the opinion of party A on issue x is similar to the 
opinion of party B on issue x and opposed to the opinion of party C; while 
on issue y, the opinion of A is opposed to B and similar to C. This cleavage 
structure prevents an increase of polarization in the overall party system 
since conflicts between parties are combined with agreements on other 
issues.  
Despite the cross-cutting nature of Chilean cleavages, there are also 
overlaps between parties’ opinions on socio-economic and 
authoritarian/democratic issues. The origin of these overlaps lies in the fact 
that human rights violations, a core aspect of authoritarian/democratic 
issues, was targeted at the ideological opponents of the military: those who 
in aspects such as welfare and the role of the state had exhibited very 
different opinions (especially the Socialists who nationalized industries and 
attempted a land redistribution program in the 1970-1973 period)36. 
Proximity and distance between parties varies depending on the issue. 
Table 21 illustrates in broad terms the pattern of polarization. The existence 
of crosscuttings on some issues neutralizes, to some extent, interparty 
opposition, leading to lower levels of polarization than if confrontation 
occurred in a cumulative way. This balance of forces is mediated by the 
PDC’s positions. The religious positions of this party, dramatically different 
from the parties which are closer to its positions on socio-economic issues 
and authoritarian/democracy issues, precludes a partisan landscape of 
three overlapped cleavages where the opposing poles would be occupied 
by the same parties on the three cleavages. On the contrary, what occurs 
is that there is quite an overlap between socio-economic and 
authoritarian/democratic positions and the religious-value cleavage takes 
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the nature of a cross cutting cleavage. From a coalitional perspective it can 
be said that, on religious issues, the division is not coincident with 
coalitions composition: the PDC is nearer to the Alianza than to its 
Concertación partners.  
 
Table 21 
General Pattern of Spatial Party proximity/distance by Issues 
 Religious-values issues Socio-economic issues Authoritarian/Democracy  
 UDI  UDI 
 RN UDI  
 PDC RN RN 
  PDC  
  PPD PDC 
 PPD PS  
 PS  PPD 
   PS 
 
From an empirical point of view, given that PDC neutralizes 
polarization, the center is critical for the understanding of polarization in 
Chile. In addition, from a theoretical point of view, a great deal of 
discussion focuses on the impact of a center in the degree of polarization. 
Empirical and theoretical reasons, therefore, suggest that the drop in the 
ideological and electoral support of the center is a critical dynamic in 
explaining polarization in Chile.  
I argue that the decrease that has taken place in the support to the 
center and its movement to the right is to a great extent the result of other 
parties’ movements, mainly the movements of leftist parties. The left has 
moved to the center on some issues (socio-economic issues, but also in 
their acceptance of democracy and political parties and the abandonment 
of their Marxist claims), resulting in a decrease in the support to the center 
and an incentive for the party that occupies it, PDC, to move to the right, 
since it needs its own ideological space. 
If, as we argue, the movement of the center to the right is the result of 
tightening the space for party competition, it can be argued that the 
positions of the center are a reflection of the changes in other ideological 
options (left and right). In other words, the nature and relative importance of 
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the center depends on the amount of distance between left and right poles: 
a decrease in the differences between left and right poles reduces the 
political space, and the center loses its political space. This is contrary to 
Scully’s argument that it is the center that shapes the degree of 
polarization. Rather, in this case, polarization has shaped the center.   
Although electoral reasons explain why the left and right have moved 
to the center, not all convergence is explained in these terms. The elite 
data suggest that a decrease in the distance between the poles of the party 
system, especially on socio-economic issues, has occurred. 
Apart from the links with polarization, the decrease in the importance 
of the center has two important consequences for Chilean partisan 
dynamics. First, the changes within the PDC that evidence the increasing 
weight of the rightist wing of the party over the nineties, have reduced the 
ideological distance between it and the major moderate party of the right, 
the RN. The distance is now not so wide as to preclude formation of a 
center-right coalition (Siavelis, 2000, p. 132). Second, the decrease in the 
electoral importance of the PDC implies a loss of relative importance within 
the Concertación and might ameliorate a situation of dominance by the 
PDC. “Leaders on the left have contended that their parties’ national 
stature and importance have been overshadowed by the dominance of the 
Christian Democrats during the first ten years of democracy” (Siavelis, 
2000, p. 133). 
Conclusions 
The explanation of the pattern that polarization has followed in the 1990s 
confirms the appropriateness of the study of the post-authoritarian Chilean 
party system in terms of the interrelation of changes and continuities. Some 
issues continue to polarize parties, whereas agreements among parties have 
arisen on other issues. Polarization in religious-value issues remains, but a 
trend toward reformulation and consensus exists with regard to socio-
economic issues. Disagreements exist on politico-institutional arrangements, 
on interpretations of the authoritarian experience, and in the democratic profile 
of the parties. In the 1990s, these have been important sources of polarization 
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in the Chilean party system.  
Disagreements on these issues take place in the Chilean party system at 
three levels. Polarization exists between coalitions and among parties. At the 
same, distance exists within coalitions.  
-polarization between coalitions: The least polarization between 
coalitions is on socio-economic issues. Distance between coalitions is much 
higher on religious-value issues and on the authoritarian/democracy cleavage. 
-polarization among parties: The highest polarization among parties is on 
religious-value issues, and the lowest distance among parties is on socio-
economic issues.  
-distance within coalitions: Issue disagreement within the Concertación is 
higher than within the Alianza on religious-value issues. In contrast, on 
authoritarian/democratic issues, there is much higher issue disagreement 
within the Alianza than within the Concertación. Distance is fairly equal within 
the coalitions regarding socio-economic issues, though Concertación is 
slightly more cohesive. 
The coalitional incentives established by the electoral system allow the 
existence of formal agreements within each of the coalitions that lead to 
moderated patterns. However, despite the surface convergence among 
parties, the individual programs and the opinions and attitudes of 
congressmen display a higher level of polarization than if the coalitions alone 
are examined.  
To answer the question of how much overall movement of the left and 
right poles to the center (and therefore, to answer the question of how 
much decrease in polarization has occurred), we must understand that this 
question is dependent on which issues are used to define the poles. Given 
the traditional dominance of socio-economic aspects for the definition of left 
and right, the consensus that has taken place over those issues has tended 
to be interpreted as a decrease in the polarization between parties. At the 
same time, the left has adopted center positions on aspects related to 
democracy and political parties and it has left behind its Marxist claims. 
This is more evidence for a movement to the center. However, there are 
important differences between parties on religious-value issues as well as 
 57
on issues related to the authoritarian past, including the institutional legacy, 
human right violations, and the role of the armed forces. The persistence of 
differences on some issues and convergence on others has led to a 
reformulation of the meanings of left and right. Due to this reformulation, 
through which parties have decreased distance on some issues, the center 
has lost part of its political space. Distance between the poles remains, but 
the meanings of left and right have changed. 
The authoritarian experience, the electoral system, and socio-economic 
transformations are powerful factors in the explanation of the evolution of 
polarization in Chile over the 1990s. However, two additional aspects that the 
polarization literature has ignored must be considered: the degree of 
negotiability of the issue and the nature of cleavages (cross cuttings and 
overlaps). These aspects, which have been considered in theoretical 
accounts of polarization and in other geographic areas, (Sanni and Sartori, 
1983; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), illuminate on explanation of polarization in 
post-authoritarian Chile. Examining the degree of the negotiability of the 
issues enables an explanation of the persistence of polarization over religious-
value issues and authoritarian/democratic issues, while programmatic 
polarization in socio-economic issues has been reduced. At the same time, 
the cross-cutting nature of the cleavages accounts for the lack of an increase 
in programmatic polarization in Chile over the 1990s. 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate the need of caution when 
assessing a decrease in programmatic polarization at the elites’ level in post-
authoritarian Chile. There is a danger of overemphasizing the degree of 
consensus between parties. Second, the convergence of the poles has 
originated more from movements of the left than from movements of the right. 
This seems to be the case for leftist parties all around the world, especially in 
economic issues. In this area parties on the left have almost unanimously 
moved from their earlier maximalist claims into moderate social democrat 
ones. Regarding economic matters in Latin America, there is an almost 
general acceptance of the Washington consensus, that promotes the 
continuity of neo liberal reforms, and which has been successfully installed in 
the programmatic views of most political parties of the region (Luna, 
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forthcoming). This does not mean that party programs are all the same, but 
that there is evidence of a shortening of distances among parties on certain 
issues. 
Two final implications can be inferred. First, the degree of polarization in 
the current party system is not a problem per se for Chilean democracy, as it 
was not the only explanation of the 1973 breakdown of democracy. However, 
the problem arises with the interaction of institutional arrangements. The 
electoral system might continue to force cooperative patterns due to the 
coalition formation incentives. However, the presidential system does not 
promote interparty collaboration and, therefore, it increases polarization. In 
charting future trends, it is likely that an important part of the content of the 
authoritarian/democratic cleavage might progressively disappear as the 
authoritarian enclaves are erased and, therefore, this cleavage will cease 
being the main line of division in structuring party competition in Chile.  
Second, the study of the distance between parties on different 
programmatic issues demonstrates that the left, center, and right categories 
are able to capture part of the content of partisan divisions. At a general level, 
left and right categories indicate either a preference for change (the left) or a 
preference for the maintenance of the status quo (the right) (Bobbio, 1996). 
This holds true in detailed study of programmatic differences among parties, 
but it is not the whole story. First, the cross cutting nature of the cleavages in 
Chile makes inaccurate unidimensional summation of the entire spectrum of 
partisan encounters. It seems that the religious-value cleavage cannot be 
translated into the left-right continuum for the Chilean case. Second, important 
redefinitions of these categories have occurred in many countries, including 
Chile. This is especially true for the left, while the center has been squeezed 
due to the movement of the left. Any argument that asserts that these 
categories persist must be accompanied by a reflection on their changing 
meanings.  
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
CPPD  Concertación de Partidos Por la Democracia 
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PC  Partido Comunista 
PDC  Partido Demócrata Cristiano 
PN  Partido Nacional 
PPD  Partido Por la Democracia 
PS  Partido Socialista 
RN  Renovación Nacional 
UCC  Unión de Centro-Centro 
UDI  Unión Demócrata Independiente 
UP  Unidad Popular 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The text was originally written the author’s Master Thesis, under the direction 
of Professor Jonathan Hartlyn, and was defended in the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill in May 2000. 
2. Ricardo Lagos, candidate of the Concertación, won 51.31% of the vote 
(3.675.255 votes) versus the 48.69% (3.486.696 votes) obtained by Joaquín 
Lavín, candidate of the Alianza.   
3. The core of this coalition were the Socialist and the Communist Party, along 
with the Radical Party and other small parties.  
4. For an analysis of this period, see Valenzuela 1978, Valenzuela 1989, and 
Valenzuela 1994. 
5. See Garretón, 1995a for a discussion of parties and opposition during the 
Pinochet years.  
6. For some authors the Chilean transition to democracy has its antecedents in 
the 1983 social revolts. At the same time, there is a great amount of 
disagreement among authors when defining the end of the transition. 
Authoritarian enclaves that remain the basis for the argument that transition is 
unfinished or incomplete. See Linz and Stepan, 1996; Garretón, 1995b. 
7. In Torcal and Mainwaring´ words “the cleavage between those who supported 
military rule and those who opposed it stands out above all else” (2003: 83). 
8. "The historical three-way division of Chilean politics persists not only at the 
electoral level but also at the elite and policy levels. Political leaders in Chile 
continue to have strong political and personal ties with individual party 
organizations and subcultures, which serve as important referents of self-
identification and political solidarity" (Siavelis and Valenzuela, 1996: 83). 
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9. Siavelis also emphasizes the effects of the extreme presidentialism of Chile 
and the way in which some contextual variables have contributed to reduction 
in political conflict during the 1990s in the Chilean political system. At the 
same time, he argues that the variables that once counterbalanced the effects 
of presidentialism have started to lose strength and that, therefore, an 
increase in conflict is likely to occur (Siavelis, 1997b; Siavelis, 2000). 
10. For an exploratory study of the meaning of left and right in Latin America 
based on the analysis of elite’ positions on different issues, see Alcántara 
1995. 
11. The data used are part of the research "Élites parlamentarias en América 
Latina" (Ref. EC95/0845), funded by the CICYT, Spain. 
12. The average of abstention between 1952 and 1973 is 14.7 for presidential 
elections, 25% for congressional elections and 29% for municipal. However, 
the data are not disaggregated into null, blank, and abstentions, therefore it is 
difficult to establish comparisons with the data about the nineties. For 
abstention data for 1925-1973, see Cruz Coke, 1984. 
13. The extent to which political parties were part of Chilean life is captured in 
Garretón’s famous characterization of “parties as the backbone of the Chilean 
society,” see Garretón 1989. 
14. After the transition to democracy, the party formerly known as PN, Partido 
Nacional, had represented Chilean traditional right since the sixties, was 
divided into two different political parties: UDI and RN.  
15. PPD was formally founded in 1992, although it had emerged in 1987 within the 
PS. The RN was formally founded in 1988 and UDI in 1989, although both of 
them existed as political movements during the early eighties. See Cañas, 
1998. 
16. This argument is still used by the parties on the right to justify the 1973 coup 
d’état.  
17. The Senate and Chamber of Deputies are elected via this method. For the 
Chamber of Deputies, the members are elected from 60 binomial districts 
(there is a total of 120 members in this chamber). Thirty eight members of the 
Senate are drawn from 19 binominal districts. The remainder of the Senate is 
appointed members.  
18. From these nine appointed senators, four are selected from the Armed Forces 
by the National Security Council, two by the president (one has to be a 
university president and the other one has to be a former minister), and three 
by the Supreme Court. All are appointed for eight-year terms. In addition to the 
nine appointed senators, all former presidents (who have ruled for six years) 
are automatically members of the Senate. Given the fact that the three 
presidents that have been elected in the post-authoritarian period belong to 
the Concertación, the artificial overepresentation of the right in the Senate will 
be progressively reduced.  
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19. It is paradoxical that the institutional engineeering argument was used to 
justify the electoral reforms (they would fix the inestability in the country and to 
avoid a new 1973), but is ignored when explaining the process of polarization 
and collapse experienced in 1973. When the military and current rightist 
parties blame the UP for the polarization and collapse experienced in 1973, 
aspects such as the type of presidentialism, which largely affected the 1973 
outcome (Shugart and Carey, 1992), are ignored. 
20. A discussion of the PC’s electoral problems in the newly founded democracy 
can be found in Roberts 1995.  
21. For a discussion of the disagreements within and between coalitions, see 
Fuentes 1999a.  
22. For a detailed analysis of Pinochet years and their socio-economic policies, 
see Collier and Sater, 1996. 
23. Regarding this, see “Why nothing much is at stake on Sunday”, in Rocinante, 
10 December, 1999. 
24. The Chilean writer Antonio Skarmeta argued that two of the errors of the 
second government of the Concertación had been the lack of a cohesive and 
clear strategy regarding Pinochet’s detention and the increase in the 
unemployment rate (Antonio Skarmeta, Los domingos de ABC, 12 December, 
1999).   
25. Together with these issues, other aspects that are progressively being 
included in Chilean partisan politics are issues related to the environment and 
indigenous claims (from the Mapuches) These issues are not as salient as the 
three sets of issues to be analyzed here. It is too early to assess if these are 
the first signs of a new line of division in Chilean party competition.  
26. To end censorship and to guarantee freedom of information is one of the goals 
under the section called “cultural aspects” of the Program of the PS for the 
2000 Presidential Elections. 
27. The UDI believes that “there is an objective moral order inherent to human 
nature. The organization of the society has to be such that all its cultural, 
institutional and economic development is fitted and subordinated to that moral 
order, basis for the Christian and Western civilization (my translation). “Existe 
un orden moral objetivo, que está inscrito en la naturaleza humana. A ese 
orden moral, fundamento de la civilización occidental y cristiana, debe 
ajustarse la organización de la sociedad y debe subordinarse todo su 
desarrollo cultural, institucional y económico” (Declaration of Principles of the 
UDI). 
28. As Haas asserts, “Ironically, with regard to much of the current social agenda 
in Chile, the Catholic Church locates its main support among those political 
elements that were most supportive of the dictatorship and are most 
ambivalent about the virtues of the democratic process”. See Haas, 1999. 
29 For an analysis of the policies of the Concertación regarding the issue of 
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Human Rights, see Lira and Loveman, 1999. 
30. However, according to some analysts, Pinochet’s detention in London has had 
the effect of strengthening the links between the rightist parties which had 
weakened. See Wolter, 1999.  
31. I distinguish ideology from issue positions. Ideology includes positions on 
issues, but it also has other aspects. Hiltes’ definition is thus: “an individual’s 
more or less articulated set of visions for society, a kind of programme which 
encompasses individual understandings of democracy, leadership, 
participation, social justice, the roles of parties and party leaders, and of ‘lo 
posible’ in their given society". See Hilte, 1996. 
32. They are not significant at 95.0% of confidence.  
33. An example of the presence of the military in the post-authoritarian political 
system is the existence of the Constitutional Court. In 1990, this Court had 
seven members who had been appointed by Pinochet. These members could 
not be removed until they reached the retirement age of 75. Further, the 
Constitution mandated that the incoming democratic president could, in the 
future, nominate only one of the Court’s seven members. Two would be 
nominated by the National Security Council, three by the Supreme Court (most 
of whom in 1990 were Pinochet appointees), and one by an absolute majority 
of the Senate (where, due to appointed senators, the democratic government 
did not have a majority). See Linz and Stepan, 1996. 
34. For example, a few days after the second round of the 2000 Presidential 
Election, Ricardo Lagos ironically characterized Lavín’s electoral program as 
“too ‘social democrat’ for a UDI leader” and that, he continued, “if the 
consensus over the different policy areas that seem to exist during the 
campaign was true, then agreements were going to be easily reached 
between the two coalitions” (Interview to Ricardo Lagos, El Mercurio, 30 
January, 2000). 
35. Just before the first round of the 1999-2000 Presidential election, in December 
1999, the Senate rejected labor legislation reform that had been initiated in 
January 1995 in the Congress. See summary of La Tercera for the year 1999. 
36. A complete analysis of the overlaps can be found in Londregan, 1998. 
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